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Abstract 
There are several differences between the type of interventions carried out by competition 
authorities and sectoral regulators and the comparison of their characteristics 
demonstrates that there are many advantages to each authority, depending on the 
situation. Thus, it is extremely important to understand the relationship between the two 
authorities and the consequences of entrusting each of them with certain tasks. The 
telecommunications sector is a good example of cooperation between competition 
authorities and sectoral regulators aiming to overcome the existing barriers to 
competition, with regulation being used as a complement to competition enforcement. 
Moreover, the study of subjects such as access regulation, and its impact on the levels of 
investment and innovation, is also very important. 
Therefore, the aim of the dissertation is to present the existing theory on the relationship 
between competition authorities and sectoral regulators, particularly regarding access 
regulation in the telecommunications sector, through a descriptive research, characterized 
by a review of the existing literature and a case study of the Telefónica case. 
Although the scenario where competition authorities and sectoral regulators are both 
responsible for competition enforcement is considered the best model by some authors, it 
is not possible to find a single solution that can be applied to all sectors and countries. 
The Telefónica case is a very important reference in this study, as it suggests the existence 
of institutional conflicts between national regulators and the European Commission, 
particularly between the 1998 regulatory framework and EU competition law. 
 
JEL-codes: K21, K23, L40, L43, L50, L96. 
Key-words: Competition Law, Competition Policy, Regulation Policy, 
Telecommunications, Access Regulation, Telefónica, European Union, Spain. 
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Resumo 
Existem várias diferenças entre o tipo de intervenção levada a cabo pelas autoridades da 
concorrência e reguladores sectoriais e a comparação das suas características demonstra 
que existem vantagens associadas a cada uma das autoridades, dependendo da situação. 
Portanto, é de extrema importância compreender como se relacionam as duas autoridades 
e as consequências de confiar certas tarefas a cada uma delas (Marques et al., 2005). O 
setor das telecomunicações é um bom exemplo de cooperação entre as autoridades da 
concorrência e os reguladores sectoriais, uma vez que neste sector existem, de facto, 
barreiras à concorrência e a regulação é um complemento necessário à defesa da 
concorrência. 
Assim, o objetivo desta dissertação é apresentar a teoria existente sobre a relação entre 
autoridades da concorrência e reguladores sectoriais, através de uma pesquisa descritiva, 
caracterizada por uma revisão de literatura e um estudo do caso Telefónica. 
Apesar de uma abordagem onde as autoridades da concorrência e os reguladores 
sectoriais são ambos responsáveis pela defesa da concorrência ser considerada a melhor 
opção por alguns autores, não é possível encontrar uma solução única, aplicável a todos 
os sectores e países. O caso Telefónica é uma referência muito importante neste estudo, 
uma vez que sugere que podem existir conflitos institucionais entre reguladores nacionais 
e a Comissão Europeia, especificamente, entre o quadro regulamentar de 1998 e o direito 
da concorrência da UE. 
 
Códigos-JEL: K21, K23, L40, L43, L50, L96 
Palavras-chave: Direito da Concorrência, Política da Concorrência, Política da 
Regulação, Telecomunicações, Regulação de Acesso, Telefónica, União Europeia, 
Espanha. 
  
 
 
 v 
Contents 
Biographic note .................................................................................................................................. i 
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................... ii 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................................. iii 
Resumo ................................................................................................................................................ iv 
List of tables ..................................................................................................................................... vii 
List of figures .................................................................................................................................. viii 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 1. Competition Policy and the Competition Authorities .................................. 3 
1.1 Brief History ................................................................................................................................ 4 
1.2 Characteristics of Competition Authorities’ Intervention ........................................ 7 
Chapter 2. Regulation and the Sectoral Regulators ............................................................ 8 
2.1 Brief History ................................................................................................................................ 8 
2.2 Characteristics of Sectoral Regulation Authorities’ Intervention ....................... 10 
Chapter 3 - The Relationship Between Competition Authorities and Sectoral 
Regulators ............................................................................................................................. 11 
3.1 Comparison Between the Characteristics of Competition and Sectoral 
Authorities’ Intervention ................................................................................................ 11 
3.2 Models of Relationship Between Competition Authorities and Sectoral 
Regulators ............................................................................................................................. 16 
3.2.1 The Telecommunications Sector in the European Union – Institutional 
Characteristics..................................................................................................................... 24 
3.2.2 The Telecommunications Sector in Portugal – Institutional Characteristics26 
3.2.3 The Telecommunications Sector in Spain – Institutional Characteristics ... 26 
3.3 Access Regulation in the Telecommunications Sector ............................................ 28 
3.3.1 The Telefónica Case ........................................................................................................... 39 
References ........................................................................................................................................ 51 
Legislation ........................................................................................................................................ 53 
Soft Law ............................................................................................................................................. 54 
Commission Decisions................................................................................................................. 54 
Case Law ........................................................................................................................................... 54 
Interinstitutional agreements .................................................................................................. 54 
 
 
 vi 
Webpages ......................................................................................................................................... 54 
  
 
 
 vii 
List of tables 
 
Table 1 – Comparison Between the Characteristics of Competition and Sectoral 
Authorities’ Intervention ................................................................................................. 11 
Table 2 – Models of Relationship Between Competition Authorities and Sectoral 
Regulators – Marques et al. (2005) ................................................................................. 17 
Table 3 – Models of Relationship Between Competition Authorities and Sectoral 
Regulators – Dabbah (2011) ........................................................................................... 19 
 
  
 
 
 viii 
List of figures 
 
Figure 1 – Three levels of action ...................................................................................... 3 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
Competition Policy can be defined as a series of laws and policies that ensure that 
economic welfare is not reduced by restrictions on competition (Motta, 2004), while 
regulation consists on restrictions to the economic agents’ actions, imposed by the state 
(Stone, 1982) (apud Viscusi et al., 2001). 
There are several differences between the type of interventions carried out by competition 
authorities and sectoral regulators and the relationship between the two authorities has 
been a subject of study of many authors, such as Marques et al. (2005) and Dabbah 
(2011), among others. 
The telecommunications sector is a good example of competition and regulation working 
together (Almunia, 2010) to overcome the existing barriers to competition (OECD, 2016), 
with regulation being used as a complement to competition enforcement (Almunia, 2010). 
On the other hand, the fact that sectors like telecommunications depend on networks that 
are costly and difficult to duplicate (OECD, 2016) highlights the importance of studying 
access regulation and the conditions in which it is set. The matter of access and 
interconnections between networks is also very important in the telecommunications 
sector since, for example, the way the access/interconnection price is set will determine 
the type of pricing competition in the downstream market (Dabbah, 2011) and, because 
of competition, this sector consists of a multitude of networks or partial networks, owned 
by many telecommunications services providers (Vogelsang, 2003).  
Finally, the Telefónica case (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica) is a 
very important reference in the study of the relationship between competition authorities 
and sectoral regulators in the telecommunications sector, particularly regarding access 
regulation, as it suggests the existence of “institutional conflicts between the Commission 
and national regulators” (Hou, 2015, p. 995). 
Therefore, the aim of the dissertation is to present the existing theory on the relationship 
between competition authorities and sectoral regulators, particularly regarding access 
regulation in the telecommunications sector, and illustrate it through the study of the 
Telefónica case (COM/38.748, Wanadoo España v. Telefónica). 
Given the main goals of the dissertation, this study involves a descriptive research 
(Saunders et al., 2009) aiming to illustrate the situation of the relationship between 
competition and regulation in the telecommunications sector, characterized by a review 
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of the existing literature and a case study. The literature review (Saunders et al., 2009) in 
this dissertation has a broader scope than usual, and consists of a brief description of the 
history of competition and regulation policy, a comparison between the characteristics of 
the intervention of the respective authorities and a “description and critical analysis of 
what other authors have written” (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 65) about the relationship 
between competition and regulation in the telecommunications sector, particularly 
regarding access regulation. To illustrate these aspects, the dissertation will also include 
a case study (Saunders et al., 2009) of the Telefónica case (COM/38.748, Wanadoo 
España v. Telefónica), due to its uniqueness (Saunders et al., 2009) and importance to 
this subject. 
This work is structured as follows: chapter 1 presents a brief history of competition policy 
in the US and the EU and the characteristics of competition authorities’ intervention; 
chapter 2 describes briefly the history of regulation in Europe and the US, and presents 
the most important characteristics of sectoral regulation authorities’ intervention; chapter 
3 begins with a comparison between these characteristics and the reasoning behind them, 
and proceeds with an analysis of the relationship between competition authorities and 
sectoral regulators, particularly in the telecommunications sector, ending with a review 
on access regulation in the telecommunications sector, complemented by the study of the 
Telefónica case (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica); finally, the last 
section concludes. 
  
 
 
 3 
Chapter 1. Competition Policy and the Competition Authorities 
Competition Policy (commonly referred to as antitrust policy in the US) can be defined 
as “the set of policies and laws which ensure that competition in the marketplace is not 
restricted in a way that is detrimental to society” (Motta, 2004, p. 28). This definition can 
be narrowed if we assume, as Motta (2004) argues in his work, that economic welfare is 
the competition authorities’ main goal and rephrased as “the set of policies and laws 
which ensure that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in such a way as to 
reduce economic welfare” (Motta, 2004, p. 28).  
In practice, competition authorities’ aim is to prevent all collusive practices between 
undertakings, the abuse of dominant positions in the market and the mergers of 
undertakings that could represent a significant threat to competition (Motta, 2004). 
Concepts like “competition policy”, “competition law”, and “competition enforcement” 
are used indiscriminately and as synonyms by many authors, including some mentioned 
in this study, without a proper justification or previous definition. Nevertheless, some 
terminological precisions are necessary. 
 
Figure 1 – Three levels of action 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the three levels of action surrounding competition. The first level, 
competition policy, concerns the economic policy options (free market, regulation, etc.) 
that signal the objectives set by the politician regarding competition and are the source of 
competition rules. At the second level, competition law, the legislator designs and 
implements the legal framework according to the economic policy options taken by the 
Politician
• Competition Policy
Legislator
• Competition Law
Comp. 
Authority
• Competition Enforcement
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politician at the first level. Finally, the third level, competition enforcement, represents 
the application of the laws designed at the second level to the specific reality of each 
sector by the competition authorities and regulators, including the ‘soft law’1 produced 
by the European Commission. This level results from an economic analysis of the law 
(Whish and Bailey, 2015) and, therefore, both economic and legal knowledge is 
necessary: “competition lawyers must understand economic concepts, and competition 
economists must understand legal processes (…), each understanding the contribution to 
be made by the other” (Whish and Bailey, 2015, p. 2). The competition authorities’ 
decisions at this level give signals of what is happening in the reality of each sector, and 
can trigger legislative changes at the second level (when they reveal that the legal 
framework is not adjusted to the reality). Moreover, this figure also reveals the 
importance of studying the interconnection between law and economics, since the 
decisions made at either level will affect the actions taken at the other levels.  
Lastly, as stated above, one of the goals of this work is to study the relationship between 
competition authorities and sectoral regulators, which means that it is situated at the third 
level. However, the remaining levels should also be considered, due to this 
interconnection between the different levels. 
 
1.1 Brief History  
The Sherman Act of 1890, which resulted from a consensus between the states to create 
a federal law that could help solve the conflicts brought by the improvement in 
transportation, communications, and manufacturing industries, marks the beginning of 
modern competition policy in the United States (Motta, 2004). The prohibition of 
collusive practices which restrict trade is established in Section 1 of this act, while Section 
2 sets the prohibition of monopolization (Motta, 2004). Many authors refer that the 
growth of the number of mergers was a consequence of the Sherman Act, which led to 
the introduction of the Clayton Act of 1914. This Act focuses on the prohibition of 
mergers that could represent a significant threat to competition and of other practices, 
such as price discrimination, and has later been amended several times to accommodate 
the necessary changes (Motta, 2004). In the same year, the Federal Trade Commission 
                                                        
1 The term ‘Soft Law’ portrays non-binding notices produced by the European Commission whose goal is 
to provide orientation to the economic agents on the applicability of ‘Council Regulations’ and the TFEU. 
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(FTC) was created through the Federal Trade Commission Act, with the purpose of 
regulating unfair trade practices in coordination with the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
(Motta, 2004).  
The Treaty of Paris, signed in 1951 between Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, signalizes the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and the starting point in competition law at a supra-national level 
(Motta, 2004). Similar to the first two sections of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act 
in the US, Article 65 of this Treaty sets the prohibition of collusive practices which distort 
or restrict trade within the Common Market, while the prohibition of abuse of dominant 
position and of mergers that could represent a significant threat to competition among 
Member States within the coal and steel industry is established in Article 66(7) (Motta, 
2004).  
The competition policy regime followed in the European Union consists of two levels of 
authority, national and supra-national (Motta, 2004). At the national level, each country 
has its own competition policy and corresponding competition law, produced by national 
legislative bodies. Furthermore, in the EU countries, there is additional competition law 
produced by the European institutions (the supra-national level) in accordance with their 
competition policy decisions, which is applicable when the offense falls on the scope of 
Community Law. 
The “effect on trade criterion is an autonomous, (…) jurisdictional criterion, which 
defines the scope of application of Community competition law” (Commission Notice 
2004/C 101/07, point 12).  It states that Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU “are applicable 
to horizontal and vertical agreements and practices on the part of undertakings” 
(Commission Notice 2004/C 101/07, point 1) “that are capable of having a minimum 
level of cross-border effects within the Community” (Commission Notice 2004/C 101/07, 
point 13), meaning that “community competition law is not applicable to agreements and 
practices that are not capable of appreciably affecting trade between Member States” 
(Commission Notice 2004/C 101/07, point 12). This “criterion also determines the scope 
of application of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down [in Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU]” (Commission Notice 
2004/C 101/07, point 8).  
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While the European Commission, the Court of First Instance, and the European Court of 
Justice only have powers to apply Community competition law, national competition 
authorities and national courts have powers to apply both national and Community 
competition law. Under Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003, where national competition 
authorities (and courts) apply national competition law to practices that are also forbidden 
under Articles 101 or 102 of the TFEU, they shall also apply the corresponding article of 
the Treaty, if said practice is “capable of appreciably affecting trade between Member 
States” (Commission Notice 2004/C 101/07, point 12). Nevertheless, “the application of 
national competition law may not lead to the prohibition of (…) practices which may 
affect trade between Member States but which do not restrict competition within the 
meaning of Article [101 of the TFUE] (…), or which fulfil the conditions of Article [101 
(3) of the TFEU] (…) or which are covered by a Regulation for the application of Article 
[101 (3) of the TFEU]” (Article 3 (2) of Regulation 1/2003), although it is still permitted 
to adopt and apply “stricter national laws which prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct 
engaged in by undertakings” (Article 3 (2) of Regulation 1/2003). Moreover, “without 
prejudice to general principles and other provisions of Community law, (…) [these 
provisions] do not apply when [national competition authorities or national courts] apply 
national merger control laws or (…) provisions of national law that predominantly pursue 
an objective different from that pursued by Articles [101 and 102 of the TFEU]” (Article 
3 (3) of Regulation 1/2003). 
The competition regime concerning undertakings currently prevailing at the supra-
national level consists of Articles 101 to 106 of the TFEU and several Council 
Regulations, including Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, regarding merger 
regulation. The institutions responsible for the competition law enforcement at a supra-
national level are the European Commission, the Court of First Instance (for legal actions 
against the Commission’s decisions) and the European Court of Justice (for appeals on 
the Court of First Instance’s judgements) (Motta, 2004). National Competition 
Authorities and national courts share the same functions at a national level (Motta, 2004), 
as explained above. 
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1.2 Characteristics of Competition Authorities’ Intervention 
According to the OECD (1999), “[competition authorities’] interventions aim to ensure 
efficiency in the functioning of goods and services markets by preventing or taking action 
against restrictions on competition (…) [which means they] regard competition as a 
process” (OECD, 1999, p. 188). To ensure this efficiency, competition “authorities assess 
conduct after the fact” (Rey, 2002, p. 44), meaning their intervention is mostly ex-post 
(OECD, 1999; Rey, 2002). However, mergers between undertakings require prior notice 
(Rey, 2002), thus competition authorities’ intervention can also be ex-ante. Other 
examples of pro-activity in competition policy (OECD, 1999) are the fact that “practices 
restricting competition are in principle prohibited” (OECD, 1999, p. 188) by law and that 
“competition authorities can [also] publish guidelines” (Rey, 2002, p. 45) that provide 
orientation on the applicability of the law (mentioned above as ‘soft law’). 
Although “competition policy is permanent” (OECD, 1999, p. 188), in the sense that the 
existing laws and regulations are applicable at any time and not only for a limited period, 
competition authorities’ interventions are occasional (Rey, 2002), occurring only “when 
they receive a complaint or otherwise believe that the competition law has been broken 
or a merger requires review” (OECD, 1999, p. 26). Besides, even though these authorities 
“occasionally conduct independent industry studies, (…) the (…) majority of cases” (Rey, 
2002, p. 43) arise from complaints (OECD, 1999), proving that private parties are 
significantly important for competition policy enforcement (Rey, 2002). 
Competition authorities “are charged with enforcing a law of general application” 
(OECD, 1999, p. 28) to all sectors, which evidences they “have a fairly universal 
mandate” (Rey, 2002, p. 46) and require, therefore, general knowledge in terms of “legal, 
economic and accounting expertise (…), but [with] relatively less need of accounting 
expertise” (OECD, 1999, p. 28). 
 
The next chapter describes briefly the history of regulation in Europe and the US, and 
presents the most important characteristics of sectoral regulation authorities’ intervention.  
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Chapter 2. Regulation and the Sectoral Regulators 
Stone (1982) defines regulation as “a state imposed limitation on the discretion that may 
be exercised by individuals or organizations, which is supported by the threat of 
sanctions” (Stone, 1982, p. 10) (apud Viscusi et al., 2001, p. 297). These restrictions 
imposed by governments can be of either economic or social nature. Given the main goal 
of this work, the focus will be given to economic regulation, as this is the area where 
conflicts may arise against competition authorities’ decisions.  
In practice, economic regulation appears most commonly in the form of price control 
(definition of minimum and/or maximum prices, price cap, amongst others), quantity 
control and entry/exit controls (Viscusi et al., 2001). The existence of economic 
regulation in a certain market does not mean, however, that the market forces do not 
intervene, as the government’s incapability of monitoring every agent and regulating 
every decision leaves room for the action of the market forces (Viscusi et al., 2001).  
 
2.1 Brief History  
The decision of the Supreme Court in the case Munn vs. Illinois in 1877 is usually pointed 
as one of the key events that illustrates the beginning of economic regulation in the United 
States, and the foundation that led to the regulation of monopolies (Viscusi et al., 2001). 
The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), whose goal was to regulate 
the rates in the railroad industry, with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 is the second 
landmark in the history of regulation in the US (Viscusi et al., 2001). The regulation of 
public utilities like electricity and telephone services and the creation of similar 
commissions began in the last decades of the 19th century and continued during the first 
decades of the 20th century, across the whole country (Viscusi et al., 2001). The 1930s 
brought a wave of economic regulation that lasted until the 1960’s, during which several 
agencies were created, such as the Federal Communications Commission in 1934, and 
many acts were passed, including the Public Utility Act, in 1935 (Viscusi et al., 2001). 
On the contrary, we witnessed the beginning of a wave of economic deregulation in 
several industries during the 1970s, that has continued during the most recent years 
(Viscusi et al., 2001).  
Similarly, Europe also experienced a growth in regulation during the 19th century, “with 
the emergence of specialist regulatory institutions” (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 4) and a wave 
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of economic regulation during the 1930’s (Baldwin et al., 2012). It was “in the post-war 
period (…) [that] the first US-style independent regulatory agency was established in 
Britain in 1954 with the Independent Television Authority” (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 4), 
which preceded the creation of several others, during the following decades (Baldwin et 
al., 2012). The end of the 1980’s brought the beginning of a process of economic 
deregulation in the telecommunications sector, which “has roughly experienced three 
major reforms” (Hou, 2015, p. 983): first, the elimination of “natural monopolies over 
telecom services and networks” (Hou, 2015, p. 983) between the end of 1980’s to 1998; 
second, a “transitional period (…) [characterized by a gradual change in]  the regulatory 
regime” (Hou, 2015, p. 983) from 1998 to 2002; and third, “the current regulatory 
framework, which became effective in 2003 and was mildly amended in 2009” (Hou, 
2015, p. 983). 
The current EU regulatory framework in the telecommunications sector consists mainly 
of four directives: Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
of 7 March 2002, on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services (Framework Directive); Directive 2002/20/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, of 7 March 2002, on the authorisation of electronic 
communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive); Directive 2002/19/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 7 March 2002, on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access 
Directive); and Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 
7 March 2002, on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) (Hou, 2015).  In 
2009, the first three directives were amended by the Directive 2009/140/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, of 25 November 2009, and the Universal Service 
Directive by the Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
of 25 November 2009 (Hou, 2015). 
However, “the EU does not have exclusive competence over telecom regulation, and most 
regulatory measures are left to the discretion of Member States (…) [, raising] a concern 
that the implementation of telecom regulation could be fragmented across EU countries” 
(Hou, 2015, p. 984). In response to these concerns, “the current regulatory framework 
establishes (…) the so-called Article 7 [of the Framework Directive] Procedure (…) [,] a 
 
 
 10 
mechanism for information exchange and consultation between national regulators and 
the Commission, (…) [which] also involves competition authorities at two levels” (Hou, 
2015, pp. 984-985). While at the national level, regulators are required to consult and take 
into consideration the national competition authorities’ opinions (Hou, 2015), at the 
supra-national level, “national regulators need to notify the Commission of their draft 
regulatory measures” (Hou, 2015, p. 985), which can be review and vetoed by the 
Commission, “also acting on its antitrust competence, (…) if they are incompatible with 
telecom regulation and EU competition law” (Hou, 2015, p. 985). 
 
2.2 Characteristics of Sectoral Regulation Authorities’ Intervention 
As we have seen before, sectoral regulation authorities’ intervention appears most 
commonly in the form of price, quantity or entry/exit controls (Viscusi et al., 2001), and 
even though the market forces may intervene in a certain market (Viscusi et al., 2001), 
these “specific regulations [work, to a certain extent, as a] substitute for market forces” 
(OECD, 1999, p. 188) and are “needed to achieve acceptable performances” (OECD, 
1999, p. 188). Therefore, most regulation authorities’ interventions “are meant to be 
temporary” (OECD, 1999, p. 188), unless the market failure they aim to correct is of 
structural nature (Marques et al., 2005).  
Given the specificities of these interventions, “sector-specific regulators typically 
intervene (…) frequently and require a continual flow of information from regulated 
entities” (OECD, 1999, p. 9), which includes, among other practices, “monitor[ing] the 
firms’ accounts on a continuous basis” (Rey, 2002, p. 46). This also means that these 
authorities’ interventions are usually ex-ante (OECD, 1999; Rey, 2002) and rely on 
“sector specific knowledge and skills” (OECD, 1999, p. 188) and “legal, economic and 
accounting expertise, with the accent probably on accounting” (OECD, 1999, p. 28)”. 
Finally, sectoral regulation authorities “are usually involved in a long-term relationship 
with regulated” (Rey, 2002, p. 46) entities, demonstrating “that “regulatory capture” 
remains a real problem” (OECD, 1999, p. 28). 
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Chapter 3 - The Relationship Between Competition Authorities and 
Sectoral Regulators 
 
3.1 Comparison Between the Characteristics of Competition and 
Sectoral Authorities’ Intervention 
The previous chapters have shown the most important characteristics of competition and 
sectoral authorities’ intervention. This chapter begins with a comparison between these 
characteristics and the reasoning behind them, which is summed up in Table 1, and 
proceeds with an analysis of the relationship between competition authorities and sectoral 
regulators, particularly in the telecommunications sector. The chapter ends with a review 
on access regulation in the telecommunications sector, complemented by the study of the 
Telefónica case (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). 
 
Table 1 – Comparison Between the Characteristics of Competition and Sectoral 
Authorities’ Intervention 
Competition Authorities’ Intervention Sectoral Authorities’ Intervention 
Intervention only needed if competition 
is restricted  
Intervention needed to achieve acceptable 
performances  
Competition as a process Substituting market forces 
Less likely to trade off conflicting goals More likely to trade off conflicting goals 
Ex post (except merger control) Ex ante 
Low capture risks High capture risks 
Private parties play an important role as a 
trigger 
Private parties play an important role as 
information providers 
General knowledge and law Specialized knowledge and rules 
Legal and Economic expertise more 
relevant 
Accounting expertise more relevant 
Permanent 
Temporary or permanent, depending on 
the circumstances 
Occasional Frequent and Continuous 
Sources: OECD (1999); Rey (2002); Marques et al. (2005). 
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Table 1 summarises the comparison between the characteristics of competition and 
sectoral authorities’ intervention. As we have seen in the previous sections, there are 
several differences between the type of intervention carried out by each of these 
authorities. 
Competition authorities “take action against restrictions on competition” (OECD, 1999, 
p. 188), whereas sectoral regulators’ “intervention [is] needed to achieve acceptable 
performances” (OECD, 1999, p. 188), which means that, while competition authorities 
“regard competition as a process, [sectoral regulators intervene as a] substitute for market 
forces” (OECD, 1999, p. 188). Contrary to what happens with competition authorities, 
sectoral regulators usually seek to achieve a “considerably broader range of goals” 
(OECD, 1999, p. 9), motivated by the “desire to correct for various market failures 
(besides the existence of market power)” (OECD, 1999, p. 25). Therefore, they may not 
only “become more adept at trading off conflicting goals” (OECD, 1999, p. 9) but, most 
importantly, “tolerate or encourage anticompetitive market structures as where cross-
subsidies are believed necessary to ensure universal service obligations are met” (OECD, 
1999, p. 25). This is a critical point, as it can be the source of conflicts between the two 
authorities. 
Another difference between the two types of intervention is that, while competition 
authorities intervene mostly ex-post (except when it comes to mergers between 
undertakings, which require prior notice), sectoral regulators intervene mostly ex-ante 
(OECD, 1999; Rey, 2002). There are several advantages of ex-ante intervention: it is less 
uncertain than ex-post intervention in the firms’ perspective (even if there is still 
uncertainty about its consequences) (Rey, 2002), since there is a greater level of 
commitment of the regulator towards the regulated entities (Rey, 2002), and these entities 
are also more likely to disclose more information than in the case of ex-post intervention 
(Rey, 2002). The commitment of the sectoral regulators to their decisions allows them to 
be more demanding towards the regulated entities by exploiting these entities’ 
demonstrated efficiency and investments (Rey, 2002) but it also provides some security 
to the entities when thinking about new investment opportunities, as they “may be better 
served through ex-ante instructions rather than by being surprised with unexpected 
requirements once sunk cost investments have been made” (OECD, 1999, p. 26). This 
could also benefit consumers “if consequent lower costs of capital are passed on in the 
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form of reduced prices or better products” (OECD, 1999, p. 26). Regulated entities will 
also be more likely to disclose more information in the case of ex-ante intervention, given 
that “it is less risky for the firm to conceal or manipulate information ex-post when it 
knows the state of nature than ex ante when it does not” (Rey, 2002, p. 45). But there are 
also several disadvantages of ex-ante intervention: decisions need to be made more 
rapidly, which adds pressure to regulators (Rey, 2002); contrary to ex-post intervention, 
it does not allow regulators to resort to new information obtained posteriorly or, even 
when ex-ante rules are flexible enough to allow posterior adjustments, the benefit brought 
by this flexibility does not make up for the difficulty of designing such rules, as opposed 
to defining ex-post rules in the first place (Rey, 2002); and, ex-ante intervention can 
promote collusion between the regulator and the regulated industry (Rey, 2002), 
increasing the risks of capture (OECD, 1999; Rey, 2002).  
The increase in the risk of capture is due, among other factors, to the long-term nature of 
the relationship between regulator and regulated entities (Rey, 2002) and their “higher 
degree of ongoing interdependence” (OECD, 1999, p. 28), which can lead the regulator 
to start “to share the industry’s perspective (…) [including] its fear of fostering greater 
competition” (OECD, 1999, p. 28), which can also be a source of conflict between 
sectoral regulators and competition authorities. Competition authorities are usually 
considered more independent than sectoral regulators (Rey, 2002), although if they are 
positioned within a ministry, there is a bigger chance of them being influenced by politics 
than independent regulators (Rey, 2002). Independent authorities have many benefits, 
such as more transparency (Rey, 2002), less vulnerability to lobbying (even if there is 
still a risk of their officers being bribed) (Rey, 2002) and a bigger chance of offering a 
fair treatment to all market players (Rey, 2002). However, they are also more likely to 
follow their own interests rather than the nation’s interests, which is usually pointed out 
as the cost of independence (Rey, 2002). Hence, to reduce the risk of capture and the 
social costs of collusion (Rey, 2002) between regulator and regulated entities, regulatory 
decisions should be less discretionary and more bureaucratized over time (Rey, 2002), 
with full transparency (Rey, 2002), and involve a bigger participation of private parties 
in the process (Rey, 2002).  
The participation of private parties in each type of intervention can come in different 
forms. In the case of competition policy, private parties play an important role as a trigger, 
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since, even though these authorities “occasionally conduct independent industry studies, 
(…) the (…) majority of cases” (Rey, 2002, p. 43) arise from complaints (OECD, 1999), 
although private parties still play a big role as information providers when an 
investigation is, in fact, carried out by competition authorities. An example of this 
triggering action is the leniency policy 2 , a very important instrument in cartel 
investigation. When it comes to regulation, private parties play a bigger role as 
information providers, as the regulatory process “requires[s] a continual flow of 
information from regulated entities” (OECD, 1999, p. 9), for example, regarding costs. 
The type of knowledge and rules followed by these two authorities can also differ. While 
competition authorities rely on general knowledge and law, since they “apply (…) general 
rules to the economy, as a whole” (OECD, 1999, p. 189), sectoral regulators depend 
mostly on specialized knowledge and rules (OECD, 1999), since they concentrate “on a 
specific industry” (Rey, 2002, p. 46), which allows them to easily “cope with (technically) 
complicated specific problems” (OECD, 1999, p. 188). This is also one of the reasons 
why “the risk of ‘capture’ seems to be smaller for a general competition authority than 
for a sector specific regulator” (OECD, 1999, p. 189). Moreover, the lack of specialized 
knowledge by the competition authorities also shows why it is more difficult for them to 
deal with cases that demand mostly quantitative evidence, such as predatory pricing, 
access pricing or tacit cartels, than those relying on qualitative evidence, such as price 
fixing or price discrimination (Rey, 2002). But there are also situations where competition 
authorities create specific, ex-ante rules (OECD, 1999), such as the rules for mergers 
between undertakings, which require prior notice (Rey, 2002), and guidelines (Rey, 2002) 
which provide orientation on the applicability of the law, also known as soft law. 
Although specialized knowledge has the advantage of allowing a “better informed 
decision making” (Rey, 2002, p. 46), it also presents two main disadvantages, namely, 
the “ratchet effect” (Rey, 2002) and, as mentioned above, the bigger risk of capture (Rey, 
2002). The “ratchet effect” describes the situation, within the Principal-Agent model, 
where “if an agent works hard and shows a good result, the principal may demand even 
better results in the future; anticipating this, the agent has little incentive to work hard in 
                                                        
2  The leniency policy is one of the instruments available to the European Commission in cartel 
investigation. It allows companies that participate in cartels to obtain either immunity or a reduction of the 
fines, if they cooperate with the Commission (by self-reporting and presenting additional evidence) and 
meet the corresponding requirements (Commission Notice 2006/C 298/11). 
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the first place” (The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2014, p. 14). In the regulatory 
context, this implies that “the firm will be reluctant to reveal that its costs are low, fearing” 
(The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2014, p. 15) that the regulator would be more 
demanding in the future, which could compromise efficiency (Rey, 2002). This effect is 
also sometimes pointed out as a constraint on the firms’ incentives to innovate (Rey, 
2002). 
The type and variety of information (OECD, 1999) that each authority requires also 
depends on the kind of intervention carried out, with “regulators (…) typically need[ing] 
a greater variety of information than competition [authorities]” (OECD, 1999, p. 26). The 
expertise required by both authorities can be divided into three categories (legal, 
economic and accounting) and, while sectoral regulators rely more on accounting 
expertise, competition authorities put the accent on legal and economic skills (OECD, 
1999). Accounting expertise is much needed by sectoral authorities when “regulating 
entry and lines of business, setting prices, ensuring appropriate levels of product quality, 
and policing universal service obligations” (OECD, 1999, p. 28), but it is also required 
by competition authorities when dealing with predatory pricing (OECD, 1999). Legal 
skills are especially important for competition authorities when “conducting case specific 
investigations” (OECD, 1999, p. 28) and economic expertise regarding “market 
definition, determining whether a firm is dominant, and estimating the anticompetitive 
potential of a particular practice or merger” (OECD, 1999, p. 28), although both types of 
expertise are also important for sectoral authorities in the interventions mentioned above 
(OECD, 1999).  
On the one hand, “competition policy is permanent” (OECD, 1999, p. 188), in the sense 
that the existing laws and regulations are applicable at any time and not only for a limited 
period. On the other hand, most regulation authorities’ interventions “are meant to be 
temporary, to engineer competition” (OECD, 1999, p. 188), unless the market failure they 
aim to correct is of structural nature, in which case they will also be permanent (Marques 
et al., 2005).  
Finally, competition authorities’ interventions are occasional (Rey, 2002), occurring only 
“when they receive a complaint or otherwise believe that the competition law has been 
broken or a merger requires review” (OECD, 1999, p. 26). On the contrary, “sector-
specific regulators typically intervene (…) frequently and require a continual flow of 
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information from regulated entities” (OECD, 1999, p. 9), which includes, among other 
practices, “monitor[ing] the firms’ accounts on a continuous basis” (Rey, 2002, p. 46). 
 
3.2 Models of Relationship Between Competition Authorities and 
Sectoral Regulators 
The comparison of the characteristics of competition authorities and sectoral regulators’ 
interventions described in the previous section demonstrates that there are several 
advantages to each authority, depending on the circumstances.  
Carlton and Picker (2014) show that “this recent history highlights a move away from 
regulation toward antitrust (…) to control competition” (Carlton and Picker, 2014, p. 43) 
and explain that the relationship between regulation and competition policy (or antitrust) 
can be one of substitution, which “involves the complete replacement of regulation with 
antitrust, as occurs when industries become deregulated” (Carlton and Picker, 2014, p. 
43), or complementarity, when competition policy controls the unregulated segments of 
a partially deregulated industry “while regulation controls the rest” (Carlton and Picker, 
2014, p. 43) and “the assignment of tasks to antitrust versus regulation is key” (Carlton 
and Picker, 2014, p. 43), or when competition policy is used “as a constraint on how 
regulation is implemented (…) [, for example,] through a double filter or double–veto 
process” (Carlton and Picker, 2014, p. 44). 
Dabbah (2011) recalls that overlap in the approaches underlying competition law and 
sectoral regulation can easily occur, in areas such as, for example, “market definition and 
assessing market power” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 115), “pricing, (…), licensing, (…) [and] with 
the issue of remedies” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 116). The author explains that market definition 
and assessing market power are important to determine not only whether there is a 
competition problem, which falls within the scope of competition law (Dabbah, 2011), 
but also “a multitude of matters, for example which operator in a sector such as 
telecommunications must offer interconnection” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 116), which falls 
within the scope of sectoral regulation. Furthermore, the decisions made under sectoral 
regulation will have an impact on competition. For example, the way the 
access/interconnection price is set will determine the type of pricing competition in the 
downstream market (Dabbah, 2011) and “the volume of licences offered (…) and the 
conditions under which they operate will have an impact on the level and scope of 
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competition which will emerge” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 116). Besides, “technical, economic 
and access regulation can also be said to share some common goals with competition law, 
most notably the goal of consumer welfare and protection” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 116). 
Therefore, it is extremely important to understand the relationship between competition 
authorities and sectoral regulators and the consequences of entrusting each of them with 
certain tasks (Marques et al., 2005). 
Authors like Marques et al. (2005) or Dabbah (2011), among others, have studied the 
relationship between competition authorities and sectoral regulators and, particularly, the 
advantages and disadvantages of assigning tasks like economic regulation and 
competition enforcement to each of them. 
Marques et al. (2005) design four models where the tasks of economic regulation and 
competition enforcement are assigned either to a sectoral regulator or to the competition 
authority, being that technical regulation3 is always assigned to the sectoral regulator 
(Marques et al., 2005) and there are other possible model designs not considered in this 
list (Marques et al., 2005). Table 2 sums up the characteristics of each model. 
 
Table 2 – Models of Relationship Between Competition Authorities and Sectoral 
Regulators – Marques et al. (2005) 
 Economic Regulation Competition Enforcement 
Model 1 Sectoral Regulator Sectoral Regulator 
Model 2 Sectoral Regulator Competition Authority 
Model 3 
Sectoral Regulator / Competition 
Authority 
Competition Authority / Sectoral 
Regulator 
Model 4 Competition Authority Competition Authority 
Source: Marques et al. (2005), p. 28 (adapted).  
 
In the case of Model 1 and Model 4, the tasks of economic regulation and competition 
enforcement are both assigned to only one of the authorities, which has the advantage of 
consistency between competition promotion and its enforcement (Marques et al., 2005). 
                                                        
3 Technical regulation “means technical specifications and other requirements or rules on services, (…) as 
well as laws, regulations or administrative provisions of Member States” (Article 1 (1)(f) of Directive 
(EU) 2015/1535) and concerns matters like quality, safety and environmental issues, and privacy 
protection (Marques et al., 2005), among others. 
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However, in Model 1, the sectoral regulators may lack the necessary skills to apply 
competition rules (Marques et al., 2005) and, in Model 4, the competition authorities may 
lack the necessary skills to apply sectoral regulation rules (Marques et al., 2005). 
Moreover, in Model 4, it cannot be expected that the competition authority fixes a price, 
as that is not compatible with its competition enforcement objectives (Marques et al., 
2005), and, in Model 1, the range of competences attributed to the sectoral regulators is 
too wide and some of them may even be withdrawn in the future (Marques et al., 2005). 
A third disadvantage of Model 1 is that, since economic regulation is attributed to the 
sectoral regulator, there is a bigger risk of capture (Marques et al., 2005), when compared 
to Models 3 and 4. Considering that, similarly to Model 1, the sectoral regulator is also 
in charge of economic regulation in Model 2, that disadvantage is also observed in this 
model (Marques et al., 2005). 
In the case of Model 2, each task is assigned to a different authority, which may lead to 
an incompatibility between economic regulation and competition enforcement (Marques 
et al., 2005). On the other hand, when compared to Model 1, Models 2, 3 and 4 have the 
advantage of restricting sectoral regulators’ actions (Marques et al., 2005). 
Finally, in Model 3, sectoral regulators and competition authorities are assigned to work 
together in both tasks, although the final decision is a responsibility of sectoral regulators, 
in the case of economic regulation, and of competition authorities, in the case of 
competition enforcement (Marques et al., 2005). The characteristics of each of the 
authorities hamper the cooperation necessary to this type of relationships (Marques et al., 
2005) and, in the case of a conflict, there is a need to decide which of the authorities 
prevails, either through an arbitration process or a prior agreement (Marques et al., 2005) 
and, when mandatory consultation is imposed, it is necessary to understand whether the 
advice given is binding (Marques et al., 2005). 
Besides, there is a risk that the regulatory process will be more bureaucratic, which 
reduces efficiency (Marques et al., 2005). But there are also advantages to these 
relationships. Since they have specialized knowledge in their respective areas, 
cooperation allows them to take advantage of this knowledge (Marques et al., 2005) and 
reach better informed decisions. Cooperation also allows to prevent inconsistencies 
(Marques et al., 2005) between economic regulation and competition enforcement. 
 
 
 19 
The authors conclude that it is not possible to find a single solution that can be applied to 
all sectors and countries (Marques et al., 2005) and the established models will be 
different from country to country and even from sector to sector within the same country 
(Marques et al., 2005), considering not only the relative advantages of each authority 
(Marques et al., 2005) but also the characteristics of the country and the sector in question 
(Marques et al., 2005). 
 
Table 3 – Models of Relationship Between Competition Authorities and Sectoral 
Regulators – Dabbah (2011) 
 Description Table 2 
Option A 
The exclusive allocation of competition enforcement 
in specific sectors to sector regulators in addition to 
technical, economic and access regulation. 
Model 1 
Option B 
The coordination of competition enforcement 
between the sector regulators (who also enforce 
technical, economic and access regulation) and the 
competition authority. 
Intermediate 
model between 
Model 2 and 
Model 3 4 
Option C 
The allocation of economic regulation and access 
regulation – in addition to competition enforcement – 
to competition authorities with technical regulation 
(perhaps with significant aspects of economic 
regulation) being handled by sector regulators. 
Model 4 
Option D 
The allocation of competition enforcement and 
access, economic and technical regulation to 
competition authorities. 
Model 4 
(modified)5 
Option E 
The exclusive allocation of competition enforcement 
in the sectors to competition authorities with 
technical, economic and access regulations being 
given to sector regulator. 
Model 2 
Option F 
The allocation of competition enforcement in the 
sectors in a concurrent manner to competition 
authorities and sector regulators with the latter also 
performing technical, economic and access 
regulation. 
Model 3 
(modified)6 
 Source: Dabbah (2011), pp. 116-117 (adapted). 
 
                                                        
4 Marques et al. (2005). 
5 While in Model 4, technical regulation is assigned to the sectoral regulator (Marques et al., 2005), in 
Option D, technical regulation is assigned to the competition authority.  
6 While in Model 3, both economic regulation and competition enforcement are assigned to both 
authorities, in Option F, concurrency only happens in the case of competition enforcement. 
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Dabbah (2011) focuses on “the most challenging question concerning” (Dabbah, 2011, 
p. 114) the relationship between competition authorities and sector regulators: “how to 
manage the interface between competition law and sectoral regulation” (Dabbah, 2011, 
p. 114). The author designs six “different “options” for regulating the sectors and for 
determining the parameters in the relationship between competition authorities and sector 
regulators” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 116), although “this list of options is [also] not exhaustive 
and one can (perhaps unnecessarily) be creative here” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 117). Table 3 
summarizes the options designed by Dabbah (2011), through a brief description (column 
“Description”) and their matching to the models designed by Marques et al. (2005) 
presented in Table 2 (column “Table 2”). 
Dabbah (2011) states that a perfect model for “determining what the parameters in the 
relationship between competition authorities and sectoral regulators should be” (Dabbah, 
2011, p. 117) cannot be invented using exact science, since they depend on several 
factors, such as “experience and practical application; (…) the institutional culture 
prevailing in the relevant country; the type and goals of the relevant competition law 
regime; and (…) the choices made by politicians and policy-makers in the country 
concerned” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 117). The author adds that the role of competition 
authorities in the different sectors is central in managing this interface and, therefore, 
considers the exclusivity of competition authorities in handling competition enforcement 
“as first, ultimate and best, scenario” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 118) and, “as a second-best 
scenario, (…) that competition authorities should handle competition enforcement in the 
sectors in concurrent manner with sector regulators” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 118). 
Dabbah (2011) lists several advantages of the first-best scenario that were also mentioned 
by Marques et al. (2005), and expands this list with other possible gains from the adoption 
of this perspective. First, “the independence of competition authorities (…) reduces the 
risk of capture” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 118). Second, by promoting competition through the 
action of competition authorities, specialists in competition law, the likelihood of 
unnecessary sector regulators will be minimized (Dabbah, 2011) and “consistency in 
competition enforcement across all sectors of the economy” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 118) will 
be achieved. Besides, competition authorities are able to consider an economy-wide 
perspective (Dabbah, 2011), which can be an advantage too. The author also mentions 
that, by minimizing the duplication of work regarding competition enforcement, there are 
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possible savings in administrative time and costs (Dabbah, 2011), and that, contrary to 
what usually happens in sectoral regulation, competition authorities are able to use a “rule 
of reason” approach (Dabbah, 2011) by comparing the pro-competitive and the 
anticompetitive effects of a certain practice before deciding whether it should be 
considered unlawful (Dabbah, 2011). 
But there are also disadvantages to the first-best model, such as the lack of specific 
technical knowledge by the competition authorities in the relevant sectors (Dabbah, 
2011), mentioned by Marques et al. (2005) as well, and of a corresponding specialised 
mechanism for settling “disputes between market players which can easily arise in the 
sectors” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 119), which could increase “the risk of a competition authority 
becoming embroiled in overly detailed and complex regulatory issues which do not have 
a sufficient link to competition” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 119). In addition, the author states that 
it is common for competition enforcement procedures to be long (Dabbah, 2011), another 
disadvantage of this model. Therefore, the author concludes that “the best scenario is not 
a perfect one” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 119). 
The opposite scenario, “exclusively allocating competition enforcement to sector 
regulators” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 119), cannot be considered viable due to serious intrinsic 
shortcomings, “which cast serious doubts over the prospects of reaching the ultimate 
destination of reliance upon the market mechanism and reduced regulation in the sectors” 
(Dabbah, 2011, p. 119). However, when sectoral regulators are involved in competition 
enforcement, their “integrated approach of technical, economic, access regulation and 
competition enforcement” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 120) enables them “to develop a broad and 
comprehensive perspective on how best to regulate the sectors” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 120), 
which can be considered an important advantage (Dabbah, 2011). But attributing 
competition enforcement exclusively to sectoral regulators is not necessary to enjoy this 
advantage (Dabbah, 2011). In fact, “the effect of these advantages can be considerably 
enhanced with competition authorities having an involvement in competition 
enforcement in the sectors alongside sector regulators” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 121). The 
concurrency model is, therefore, considered the second-best scenario (Dabbah, 2011), 
since it “maximises the advantages enjoyed by competition authorities and sector 
regulators and at the same time addresses the different disadvantages from which they 
suffer” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 121).  
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Dabbah (2011) explains that concurrency allows competition authorities to perform many 
competition enforcement tasks, such as, for example, establishing important precedents 
and practices in the use of competition law analysis and procedures by sectoral regulators 
(Dabbah, 2011), playing an influential role in defending the “inaction” of sectoral 
regulators, especially when there is some degree of competition in the relevant sector 
(Dabbah, 2011) and promoting “the adoption of a pro-competition approach by sector 
regulators even where the sector regulators’ statutory duties do not include the promotion 
of competition in their sectors” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 123). This can be translated, for 
example, into the “promotion of competition by pushing for the removal of unnecessary 
regulation” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 123).  
Concurrency also allows competition authorities to guide policy and decision-makers 
(Dabbah, 2011) in the design of the legislative framework in which the sectoral regulators 
operate, by pushing for pro-competition legislative changes or to ensure that competition 
enforcement is considered when new legislation (or amendments to existing legislation) 
is proposed (Dabbah, 2011). Besides, competition authorities can more easily assess the 
existing level of competition and the necessity for continued regulation of a certain sector 
when they are actively involved in said sector (Dabbah, 2011). Additionally, competition 
authorities can have an important role in supervising “whether competition law is being 
applied consistently across the board in the sectors and the performance of sector 
regulators in terms of their adherence to principles of good regulation” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 
124). 
Dabbah (2011) also states that there are some challenges underlying concurrency, 
namely: duplication of work due to a lack of adequate coordination between the two 
authorities (Dabbah, 2011); “the role of non-competition considerations and differences 
in approach” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 126), for example, regarding market definition (Dabbah, 
2011), which can hinder the building of proper economic analysis expertise in the long 
term (Dabbah, 2011) and cause a “likely reduction of legal certainty enjoyed by operators 
in the sectors” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 128); and the occurrence of forum shopping (Dabbah, 
2011), as “firms may play the competition authority and the sector regulator(s) against 
one another” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 128). However, there may be advantages to presenting 
the firms with a choice of authorities, “especially where they feel that a sector regulator 
is unable to give sufficient attention to the importance of facilitating and maintaining 
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effective competition, (…) [and] the competition authority is better placed and equipped 
to deal with the matter at hand” (Dabbah, 2011, pp. 128-129). Regarding the second 
difficulty, the author also explains that “it is important not to make overly general 
statements, which may convey a not-fully-accurate impression that all sector regulators 
rely upon regulatory convenience when defining the relevant market in actual cases” 
(Dabbah, 2011, p. 128) since, in some cases, sectoral regulators “have engaged in a 
market definition exercise (…) along the lines seen in the practice of many competition 
authorities” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 128). 
Finally, the author specifies that it is possible to overcome these difficulties by ensuring 
“proper coordination between the competition authority and the sector regulator(s)” 
(Dabbah, 2011, p. 129) and describes six models7 that are present around the world and 
should be noted: the common forum model; the cross-membership model; the 
intervention, representation and consultation model; the customary “best practices” 
model; the dis-application model; and the immunity model  (Dabbah, 2011). 
Therefore, Dabbah (2011) concludes that “out of the different options available, 
concurrency stands out as a very practical and pragmatic approach to managing the 
interface between competition enforcement and sectoral regulation” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 
141), choosing it “as the best model” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 141). Still, several aspects need 
to be considered when concurrency is the model chosen, such as, for example, “the wider 
institutional culture prevailing in the country concerned in relation to addressing 
economic and noneconomic issues; the vision held by the government of the country 
concerned on the deregulation question in the sectors and the role the government or a 
minister may play in sectoral regulation; and, finally, the particular competition law 
regime in the country” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 141) and the competition policy goals at the 
national level (Dabbah, 2011). 
In conclusion, the differences in the characteristics of these authorities and “the existence 
of [both] overlap and common goals between competition law and sectoral regulation 
means that the picture in practice is complex” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 116) and the comparative 
advantage of each of them is crucial for boundaries definition (Carlton and Picker, 2014). 
The recognition of these comparative advantages has led to a “partial and full 
                                                        
7 For further information on the characteristics of these models and examples of their application, consult 
Dabbah (2011). 
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deregulation movement” (Carlton and Picker, 2014, p. 58), although “this does not (…) 
mean that all regulation should vanish, especially for industries with natural monopoly 
characteristics, but rather that, when necessary, regulation should try to allow as much 
competition as possible, constrained only by (…) [competition] law” (Carlton and Picker, 
2014, p. 26). This also means that it is unlikely that a solution applied to all sectors and 
countries can be found (Marques et al., 2005) and “it is possible that in one and the same 
country different options may be followed in different sectors” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 115) 
“as opposed to one single approach for all sectors” (Dabbah, 2011, p. 132). Besides, these 
options are unlikely to be static (Marques et al., 2005), since they depend, among other 
factors, on the level of effective competition in the sector concerned (Marques et al., 
2005). 
 
3.2.1 The Telecommunications Sector in the European Union – Institutional 
Characteristics 
In the European Union, national sectoral regulators (or national regulatory agencies – 
NRA) oversee the domestic regulatory framework in their respective sector, while the 
European Commission, as the supra-national competition authority, “investigates and 
decides on restrictions of competition in all sectors, including telecommunications” 
(DGCEC, 2005, p. 33), when the offense falls on the scope of Community Law, as 
explained in section 1.1. Under the current regulatory framework for electronic 
communications mentioned in section 2.1, “the European Commission has (…) [also] 
been given a role in the adoption of national-level regulations in the Member States, 
including, in certain cases, veto powers over proposed regulatory interventions” 
(DGCEC, 2005, p. 33). It is also important to emphasize the financial and political 
independence of the European Commission towards the Member-States’ national 
governments (DGCEC, 2005), although the DGCEC “cannot comment on the level of 
autonomy of NRAs” (DGCEC, 2005, p. 34). 
The four directives mentioned in section 2.1 lay down the relationship between the 
European Commission and national sectoral regulators (DGCEC, 2005) and “the new 
regulatory framework aims to make the two kinds of intervention complementary” 
(DGCEC, 2005, p. 34), since they both deal with the same problem (“high levels of 
market power and the likelihood of it being abused” (DGCEC, 2005, p. 37)) and try to 
 
 
 25 
achieve the same goal (“putting the end user at the centre of any economic activity” 
(DGCEC, 2005, p. 37)). Besides, “regulation has been increasingly determined by a 
competition policy perspective” (DGCEC, 2005, p. 36). The Framework directive, for 
example, requires national sectoral regulators “to carry out market analyses to establish 
the state of competition in relevant communications markets and identify any providers 
with Significant Market Power (SMP) in these markets” (DGCEC, 2005, p. 35) and, when 
they consider that an operator has SMP, they must “identify which specific obligations 
are appropriate to impose on that operator” (DGCEC, 2005, p. 35), that will be determined 
“according to the nature and the source of the competition problem, which, combined 
with the wealth of possible remedies to be used, allows for a high degree of tailoring to 
specific circumstances” (DGCEC, 2005, p. 35). On the other hand, the Universal Service 
Directive outlines “a minimum set of services of specified quality to which all end-users 
must have access, at an affordable price (…) [and] also contains certain provisions on the 
financing of universal services” (DGCEC, 2005, p. 36). Therefore, each Member-state 
and its national sectoral regulators must ensure the implementation of this directive within 
their territory by, among other things, “imposing universal service obligations on 
undertakings and monitoring the respect of such obligations” (DGCEC, 2005, p. 36), 
while the European Commission monitors the correct implementation of this directive by 
the Member States and “ensures that the provision and financing of universal services 
does not distort competition” (DGCEC, 2005, p. 36). DGCEC (2005) also emphasises 
that “the new regulatory framework also covers relations between the various national 
sectoral regulators in the Member States, by creating a “European Regulators Group” (…) 
[, which] has met several times, and has agreed, for example, on competition remedies to 
be used in the field of electronic communications” (DGCEC, 2005, p. 36). 
Therefore, DGCEC (2005) concludes that “regulatory policy cannot be seen any more as 
independent of competition policy (…) [but] as a part of a broader set of tools of 
intervention in the economy based on competition principles of analysis” (DGCEC, 2005, 
p. 37) and “the term ‘sector-specific regulation’ (…) could become obsolete” since it is 
expected that, in the future, the same set of tools and approaches will manage every sector 
where economic regulation is still deemed as necessary (DGCEC, 2005). In this sense, 
the European Commission believes that the model of relationship between competition 
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authorities and sectoral regulators in the electronic communications sector could become 
an example to be followed by other sectors (DGCEC, 2005). 
 
3.2.2 The Telecommunications Sector in Portugal – Institutional Characteristics 
The Portuguese Competition Authority (Autoridade da Concorrência – AdC) was created 
(and the respective statutes approved) on 18 January 2003, through the Decree-Law no. 
10/2003. On 26 September 2003, the AdC celebrated a cooperation agreement with 
ANACOM (Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações), the Portuguese telecommunications 
sector regulator, with the goal of facilitating the cooperation between the two authorities, 
“avoiding the duplication of work and ensuring the coherence between the decisions or 
measures taken” (ANACOM, 2003, Introduction). Clause 3 of this agreement establishes 
that the parties agree to provide the information in their possession whenever the other 
party requests so in writing, if the request is considered reasonable, while Clause 4 states 
that the parties must consult each other when they acknowledge they are both analysing 
the same situation, to decide who should have the powers to adopt the final decision, 
while “the other party (…) refrain[s] from any subsequent intervention other than 
replying within a consultation procedure” (ANACOM, 2003, Introduction). The statutes 
of ANACOM currently prevailing were approved on 16 March 2015, through the Decree-
Law no. 39/2015. 
Article 5 (4) of the Law No 19/2012, the current Portuguese competition act, predicts the 
possibility for sectoral regulators and the Portuguese competition authority to celebrate 
cooperation agreements, such as the one described above. Moreover, Articles 35 and 55 
of the same law establish an outline of how the articulation between the competition 
authority and the sectoral regulators should occur, namely on prohibited practices and 
control of concentrations.  
 
3.2.3 The Telecommunications Sector in Spain – Institutional Characteristics 
The Spanish telecommunications sector regulator, Comisión del Mercado de las 
Telecomunicaciones (CMT), was created in 1996 and the Spanish competition authority, 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (CNC), was created in 2007 (CNMC, 2017).  
In 2013, the national competition authority and six sectoral regulators (CMT, in the 
telecommunications sector; CNE, in the energy sector; CRF, in the railway sector; 
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CEMA, in the audio-visual media sector; CNSP, in the postal service sector; and CREA, 
in the airport sector) were unified into a single authority, the CNMC (Comisión Nacional 
de los Mercados y la Competencia), to avoid duplication of work and contradictory 
decisions, through an integrative vision (CNMC, 2017). 
Before the formal unification “an initial draft Act creating the CNMC (…) [had] been 
unofficially circulating on the internet and (…) submitted to the affected bodies for their 
reports” (Allendesalazar, 2012, p. 103). This draft, which was highly criticized 
(Allendesalazar, 2012), stated the unification of the seven authorities listed above and the 
extinction of the regulator of gambling activities and services (Allendesalazar, 2012). In 
practice, this merger would mainly affect the CNC, the CNE, the CMT and the postal 
regulator, since most regulatory agencies “had been created recently and had not 
effectively initiated their activities” (Allendesalazar, 2012, p. 103). On the other hand, 
“the Central Bank, the Stock Exchange and the nuclear energy regulator (…) [would] 
remain independent (…) [and] others such as the NRA for tobacco markets, seem to have 
been forgotten” (Allendesalazar, 2012, p. 103).  
Allendesalazar (2012) lists three major criticisms to this draft: “the goals of the proposal 
are unclear (…) [and there is a] lack of transparency in the procedure prior to the adoption 
of the draft” (Allendesalazar, 2012, p. 104); “the CNMC is likely to be less independent” 
(Allendesalazar, 2012, p. 106); and “the CNMC is bound to be less effective, at least for 
a certain time” (Allendesalazar, 2012, p. 107). 
The author also suggests designing a possible alternative reform, regarding three aspects: 
reducing the number of NRAs, since, as mentioned above, many regulators had been 
recently created and had “not yet started to work effectively” (Allendesalazar, 2012, p. 
107) and there are many advantages to multi-industry regulators (Allendesalazar, 2012), 
such as “sharing resources; facilitating learning across industries; reducing the risk of 
industry and political capture; reducing the risk of economic distortion among competing 
industries; and dealing with blurring industry boundaries” (Allendesalazar, 2012, p. 108); 
keeping the national competition authority and sectoral regulators as “separate but 
complementary agencies” (Allendesalazar, 2012, p. 109); and handling changes with 
caution, since the creation of a multi-sectoral regulator from scratch “is usually easier 
than merging pre-existing agencies” (Allendesalazar, 2012, p. 110). So, “any decision to 
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merge should provide for a smooth transition to avoid the welfare cost of a regulatory 
lag” (Allendesalazar, 2012, p. 110).  
Finally, the author specifies that because of “the numerous criticisms and comments to 
the initial draft, the Government (…) decided to introduce some important modifications 
(…) to try to tackle these reproaches, particularly those expressed by the European 
Commission”8 (Allendesalazar, 2012, p. 110). 
 
3.3 Access Regulation in the Telecommunications Sector 
The telecommunications sector is “a great example of regulation and competition 
working hand in hand” (Almunia, 2010, p. 5), since there are, in fact, barriers to 
competition (OECD, 2016) and “regulation has been a necessary complement to 
competition enforcement” (Almunia, 2010, p. 5). The main barrier to competition in 
network industries, such as telecommunications, is their reliance on “facilities that are not 
easy or economic to duplicate” (OECD, 2016, p. 60). For that reason, “access regulation, 
i.e., the requirement for the firms that own essential facilities to provide access to other 
firms at a regulated price” (Lestage and Flacher, 2014, p. 569) is essential for promoting 
competition (Lestage and Flacher, 2014) and efficiency and, thereby, enhancing social 
welfare in network industries (Grajek and Röller, 2012). 
 
Access Regulation and Investment 
Lestage and Flacher (2014) “compare the optimal access regulation under three different 
market configurations that approximate the different stages of telecommunications 
market liberalization” (Lestage and Flacher, 2014, p. 569). This approach, known as 
‘ladder of investment’, was first introduced by Cave (2006). 
In the first stage, the entrants cannot build their own facilities and “only an incumbent 
may invest in a new infrastructure” (Lestage and Flacher, 2014, p. 569), which means 
that, when balancing static efficiency and investment, the regulator may determine that 
the optimal access price is above marginal cost (Lestage and Flacher, 2014). In the second 
stage, entrants can either access the existing infrastructure or build their own (Lestage 
and Flacher, 2014) and, therefore, there are two possible outcomes. On the one hand, 
when “entrants tend to underinvest, the optimal access price balances between static 
                                                        
8 For more information on these modifications, consult the postscript of Allendesalazar (2012). 
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efficiency and investment” (Lestage and Flacher, 2014, p. 576). On the contrary, when 
entrants overinvest, the optimal access price should be set as low as possible, to minimize 
infrastructure duplication (Lestage and Flacher, 2014). To explain these results, the 
authors argue that a low access price will “strengthen competition between Internet 
service providers, which in turn improves welfare” (Lestage and Flacher, 2014, p. 570), 
but it will also reduce the firms’ incentives to invest, which could increase or decrease 
welfare, depending on the level of investment of the Internet service providers (Lestage 
and Flacher, 2014). 
Finally, in the third stage, “both incumbents and entrants may invest, and access 
regulation affects both the incentives to build new infrastructures and the incentives to 
duplicate these infrastructures” (Lestage and Flacher, 2014, p. 576). Therefore, if the 
regulator decides to promote infrastructure duplication, the access price will be set above 
the one observed in the first stage, regardless of the level of investment of the Internet 
service providers (Lestage and Flacher, 2014). This happens because “the access price 
may at the same time induce more duplication and reduce overinvestment, (…) [since] it 
increases both the private and the social incentives for infrastructure duplication” 
(Lestage and Flacher, 2014, p. 570). 
Lestage and Flacher (2014) conclude that this model demonstrates the difficulty of access 
regulation, especially when Internet service providers tend to overinvest (Lestage and 
Flacher, 2014). When that is the case, “regulatory authorities face a dilemma: on the one 
hand, high access prices would foster investment in new infrastructures but also 
encourage wasteful duplication; on the other hand, low access prices would limit 
infrastructure duplication but would also discourage ISPs [Internet Service Providers] 
from rolling out new infrastructures” (Lestage and Flacher, 2014, p. 576).  
Similarly, Manenti and Scialà (2013) present “a model of competition between an 
incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications (Manenti and Scialà, 2013), where 
the entrant can decide whether to invest in its own infrastructure before entering the 
market and, “in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the 
provision of enhanced services” 9 (Manenti and Scialà, 2013, p. 450). The incumbent, on 
                                                        
9 Facilities-based competition describes the situation where “entrants invest in their own infrastructure” 
(Grajek and Röller, 2012, p. 190), as opposed to services-based competition, where “entrants rely on 
regulated access to incumbents’ infrastructure” (Grajek and Röller, 2012, p. 190). 
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the other hand, can always choose to update its network to provide advanced services 
(Manenti and Scialà, 2013), regardless of the option chosen by the entrant.  
The authors “study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry (service based vs 
facility based) and on the amount of [firms’] investments in advanced communications 
services” (Manenti and Scialà, 2013, p. 464) and conclude that, when the access price is 
not regulated, it is optimal for the incumbent “to foreclose service based entry by fixing 
a sufficiently high access price” (Manenti and Scialà, 2013, p. 464), which will generate 
a socially inefficient outcome (Manenti and Scialà, 2013). This result is consistent with 
the existing literature, since Sarmento and Brandão (2007) state that “without access price 
regulation the upstream monopolist might use its market power to foreclose its 
downstream rivals” (Sarmento and Brandão, 2007, p. 236). 
But, when the access price is regulated, welfare enhancing investments may be 
discouraged, which will also lead to a socially inefficient outcome (Manenti and Scialà, 
2013). 
Moreover, the authors state that when the access price is regulated after the firms invest 
in advanced services, regulatory failures can arise (Manenti and Scialà, 2013, p. 465), 
since “access regulation promotes service based entry (…) [even] when facility based 
entry would be socially desirable (and it would actually emerge at the equilibrium without 
regulation)” (Manenti and Scialà, 2013, p. 465). On the other hand, when the access price 
is regulated before the firms invest, “regulatory failures can be reduced but not 
eliminated” (Manenti and Scialà, 2013, p. 465). 
Therefore, although it aims to promote competition, it is also important to consider the 
impact of access regulation on investment, as “maintaining and developing network 
industries call for large capital expenditures” (Lestage and Flacher, 2014, p. 569) and, if 
firms are required to share their infrastructures with competitors, their incentives to invest 
may be significantly reduced (Lestage and Flacher, 2014, p. 569). Lestage and Flacher 
also explain that “in telecommunications, it is often argued that although local loop 
unbundling is required to avoid remonopolization, the access price should be high enough 
to preserve the incentives to build next generation networks” (Lestage and Flacher, 2014, 
p. 569). 
Kim et al. (2011) study “the effects of MVNO [mobile virtual network operators] entry 
and access regulation on the investment behavior of MNOs [mobile network operators, 
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using] (…) firm-level data for 58 MNOs in 21 OECD countries during 2000–2008 (…) 
[and] suggest that mandated provision of access is related to lower investment intensity 
of MNOs, while voluntary access provision has no effect” (Kim et al., 2011, p. 907). The 
lower investment intensity observed when mandatory access provision exists is possibly 
explained by the adjustments in the investment levels MNOs may be forced to incur 
because of regulation and entry by MVNOs (Kim et al., 2011). Therefore, the second 
option is preferable than the first and “prevails in more and more countries” (Kim et al., 
2011, p. 916). The authors also note that “the countries that have allowed MVNOs in the 
market are mostly in Europe, (…) [but] the experience of these countries provides lessons 
for those countries contemplating granting access to MVNOs” (Kim et al., 2011, p. 908). 
These results are in accordance with the ones obtained by Grajek and Röller (2012), who 
demonstrate that access regulation has “a negative effect on both total industry and 
individual carrier investment” (Grajek and Röller, 2012, p. 189). The authors also specify 
that, by allowing a relatively easy access to the incumbent’s infrastructure, the 
incumbent’s incentives to invest in the improvement of its infrastructure might be 
undermined, much like the entrants’ incentives to invest in their own infrastructure, “even 
as entrants’ total investment increases” (Grajek and Röller, 2012, p. 192). This happens 
because “access regulation reduces barriers to entry, (…) [as] entrants do not need to 
duplicate the existing network, but it also reduces incentives to build new infrastructure 
(…) [since it] can be rented from incumbents at mandated prices” (Grajek and Röller, 
2012, p. 190). The concept of facilities-based competition reflects this trade-off and, 
although it is suggested that easy access will narrow the incentives for entrants to invest 
under this type of competition, the same conclusion might not be applicable to their 
incentives to invest in upgrading the incumbent’s infrastructure, since, if the entrants 
intend to provide a broader service than the incumbent, they will need further investments 
in infrastructures (Grajek and Röller, 2012, p. 190). On the contrary, entrants’ investment 
has a positive effect on incumbent’s investment, since “incumbents invest more as 
entrants’ total investment increases” (Grajek and Röller, 2012, p. 192).  
The authors conclude that their results “are consistent with the view that the regulatory 
framework in Europe fails to deliver effective incentives to move toward facilities-based 
competition” (Grajek and Röller, 2012, p. 211) in the telecommunications sector. They 
also suggest that “the regulatory environment in Europe is subject to a regulatory 
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commitment problem” (Grajek and Röller, 2012, p. 211), because, while entrants’ 
investment does not affect access regulation, an increase in the incumbent’s investment 
in infrastructures will prompt the regulator to provide easier access, which will undermine 
the incumbent’s incentives to invest in infrastructures (Grajek and Röller, 2012). 
On the other hand, the results obtained by Garrone and Zaccagnino (2015) “support the 
view that competition does not depress investments at firm and country levels” (Garrone 
and Zaccagnino, 2015, p. 388).  
 
Access and Interconnections between Networks 
The matter of access and interconnections between networks is also very important in the 
telecommunications sector since, because of competition, this sector consists of a 
multitude of networks or partial networks, owned by many telecommunications services 
providers (Vogelsang, 2003). 
Vogelsang (2003) describes interconnection as the situation where “two networks are 
linked to provide call origination, transit, and termination for each other, and the networks 
operate at the same level of network hierarchy” (Vogelsang, 2003, p. 830) and access as 
the “cases where the networks operate at different hierarchical levels and only one 
network uses the other to originate or terminate calls” (Vogelsang, 2003, p. 830). Access 
and interconnection allow all the telecommunications service providers, except for 
private networks, to create a “network of networks” (Vogelsang, 2003, p. 830), where 
they can access other firms’ networks or interconnect with each other (Vogelsang, 2003), 
and without them, “such networks – and competition between them – would hardly have 
spread so quickly” (Vogelsang, 2003, p. 830). 
There are several advantages to access and interconnections for consumers and the 
competitive process: they allow consumers “to call anybody and be called by anybody 
(the any-to-any principle) without having to sign up with a system-wide network 
monopolist” (Vogelsang, 2003, p. 830), and, since entrants are not required to invest in 
full-coverage networks, this will help reduce the barriers to entry and, consequently, 
market power (Vogelsang, 2003). Therefore, they are “indispensable for the functioning 
of a competitive telecommunications market” (Vogelsang, 2003, p. 830). On the other 
hand, they also have disadvantages, since there is an incentive for collusion, when the 
competing networks that interconnect are sufficiently symmetric (Vogelsang, 2003); and 
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“the originally dominating network providers have few incentives to give competitors 
access to their facilities, especially to those that are hard or impossible to duplicate” 
(Vogelsang, 2003, pp. 830-831). Therefore, regulating access and interconnection prices 
in the telecommunications sector is of major importance (Vogelsang, 2003, p. 831) and 
requires a very technical and deep knowledge of the sector, which favours sectoral 
regulators over competition authorities (Vogelsang, 2003). However, “as 
telecommunications competition matures, many of the technical problems will have been 
solved routinely, so that competition policy can take over” (Vogelsang, 2003, p. 859). 
 
Policy Issues Regarding Telecommunications  
More recently, Vogelsang (2014) describes the current telecommunications policies 
followed in the USA and the EU, and studies whether these policies are likely to converge 
in the future. Given the purpose of this study, its focus will be the EU policy.  
The author explains that “three comparatively new technology and market trends are 
determining the current and future telecommunications policies in both the U.S. and the 
EU” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 3): “digital convergence of telecommunications networks, the 
spread of next generation access (NGA) networks and the rise of high-speed mobile 
networks (4G/LTE)” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 3). The impact of these new technologies and 
trends on policies and the speed of their development “will depend on (…) institutional, 
geographic, network-related and market factors” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 3).  
First, the institutional factors comprise “the legal and political environment” (Vogelsang, 
2014, p. 1). In the European Union, most telephone networks are currently privatized, 
although they “were until about two decades ago owned by PTTs [(Post, Telephone, and 
Telegraph)] and (…) part of ministries” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 2). Vogelsang adds that, 
although privatization was difficult to accomplish, it created the opportunity to establish 
new institutions and regulatory rules (Vogelsang, 2014). Second, geographic factors 
comprise “general population densities and the degree of urbanization, which determine 
network densities and thereby the costs per user” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 2). Third, network-
related factors comprehend “technical differences of legacy networks [that] can derive 
from different architectures used in building the original infrastructure” (Vogelsang, 
2014, p. 2), since each European country developed its own telephone network 
independently and with significant differences from the remaining countries, and by 
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following different approaches, for example, regarding cable TV networks (Vogelsang, 
2014). Finally, market factors “depend on the types of users (…) and structure and types 
of suppliers, including the degree of vertical and horizontal integration” (Vogelsang, 
2014, p. 3). 
In the European Union, regulation in the telecommunications sector “was always seen as 
a transitory move between privatization and competition policy” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 6). 
Besides, since competition policy has increasingly become more regulatory, this 
movement from sectoral regulation to competition policy “appears to be smaller today 
than in the past (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 6). Moreover, regulators have also started to concern 
about protecting competition, alongside with consumer protection (Vogelsang, 2014). 
Finally, the author explains that the European Union actively supports the consolidation 
of carriers, since there are no mobile or fixed networks “even close to covering half of 
the EU” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 6) and the majority of countries still have a dominant fixed 
and cable network firm (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 6). 
Vogelsang (2014) analyses five policy issues: “interconnection/termination monopoly, 
local access bottleneck, net neutrality, spectrum management, and universal service” 
(Vogelsang, 2014, p. 3). The first issue, interconnection/termination between 
telecommunications networks, “has been both the basis for network competition and the 
source of positive externalities for telecommunications users” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 8), as 
demonstrated in the author’s previous work (Vogelsang, 2003). Apart from some 
countries where the networks do not charge each other for terminating incoming traffic, 
telephone and mobile networks usually pay a termination charge, which is the price for 
the termination of calls that originate in their network and terminate in the others’ 
(Vogelsang, 2014). If these payments are not regulated, they can become an important 
source of income to the firms and a mean for larger networks to raise the smaller rivals’ 
costs, which is a significant policy issue (Vogelsang, 2014). The author points out two 
major differences between fixed and mobile termination charges in the EU. First, while 
“termination charges in fixed networks (fixed-to-fixed = FTF and mobile-to-fixed = 
MTF) have been regulated since the beginning of liberalization” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 8), 
mainly based on LRAIC (Long–Run Average Incremental Costs), “termination in mobile 
networks (mobile-to-mobile = MTM and fixed-to-mobile = FTM) has in many EU 
countries only been regulated for the last ten years because of the long-time held mistaken 
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belief that competition between mobile carriers would keep mobile termination charges 
down” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 8). Second, “mobile termination costs were deemed 
substantially higher than fixed termination costs, (…) [although] unregulated mobile 
termination charges were still substantially above those higher costs” (Vogelsang, 2014, 
p. 8). Vogelsang (2014) also states that, over the last years, the EU has been furtherly 
moving from a LRAIC approach to a “pure LRIC” [(Long–Run Incremental Costs10)] one 
as “the basis for mobile termination charges” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 8), which has resulted 
in its substantial reduction “(and a lesser reduction for fixed termination)” (Vogelsang, 
2014, p. 8). 
Regarding local access bottlenecks, regulation of wholesale access charges in the EU has 
followed, in most cases, the LRAIC approach (Vogelsang, 2014), while, although next 
generation access [NGA] is mandatory, its charges are not regulated (Vogelsang, 2014). 
The author also explains that “the emphasis on infrastructure investment in NGA has led 
to softer regulation of copper and NGA access (…) [, leaving] the door open for more 
stringent regulation if inter-modal competition and the competition from copper access 
prove to be insufficient” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 16). 
The definition of net neutrality11 has evolved among the economists from its original 
definition into a “differentiated policy issue, consisting of a zero price rule (…) [that] 
would disallow termination fees for the access of content service providers (CSPs) to end-
users” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 17) and “a non-discrimination rule (…) [that] meant no 
quality of service (QoS) differentiation, no degradation of traffic, blocking, throttling 
(vertical foreclosure) and no exclusive contracts” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 17). In the 
European Union, the European Parliament has recently approved net neutrality 
regulations that are much more severe than the policy that had been in place since 2009, 
“which required transparency and allowed NRAs to impose minimum QoS standards” 
                                                        
10 LRIC (Long-Run Incremental Costs) “are all costs that are associated only with the production of a 
specific service (…) [and that] a producer would avoid if a specific product (or some other increment) 
would no longer be produced. Therefore, incremental costs also include the fixed costs which are specific 
to the particular increment under consideration (e.g., a particular service)” (Dewenter and Haucap, 2007, 
p. 13). 
11 According to the European Parliament, “the principle of "net neutrality" in the open internet means that 
traffic should be treated equally, without discrimination, restriction or interference, independent of the 
sender, receiver, type, content, device, service or application” (Position of The European Parliament, 
adopted at first reading on 3 April 2014). 
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(Vogelsang, 2014, p. 18), although these policies are still “a work in progress” 
(Vogelsang, 2014, p. 23). 
Spectrum policies aim “to maximize the economic value of spectrum use” (Vogelsang, 
2014, p. 23). The European Commission is “taking initiatives for international 
coordination of spectrum policies and spectrum allocations” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 26), 
which is especially important, considering “the small size of European countries and the 
amount of spectrum held unused in order to avoid interference across borders” 
(Vogelsang, 2014, p. 26). This happens because the spectrum ownership is geographically 
fragmented (Vogelsang, 2014), since “spectrum licenses in the EU generally cover a 
whole member state, but contiguous licenses for all member states currently are almost 
impossible to accumulate” (Vogelsang, 2014, pp. 26-27), which hinders “the creation of 
international fully integrated carriers” (Vogelsang, 2014, pp. 26-27) and explains the 
existence of important policy issues that result from the lack of integration, such as 
international roaming inside the EU (Vogelsang, 2014). So, even though “there is a move 
towards spectrum harmonization in the EU, (…) convergence of policies within the EU 
could take quite a long time” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 27). 
Finally, universal service can be narrowly interpreted has “the connectivity of the poor 
and high-cost areas to traditional networks (…) to achieve 100% telephone penetration” 
(Vogelsang, 2014, p. 27). Its traditional policies include direct subsidies and cross 
subsidies “(from business to residential, from long-distance to local and from urban to 
rural)” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 27), although the tendency has been to avoid the second 
instrument (Vogelsang, 2014). On the other hand, “a broad interpretation of universal 
service also includes policies that increase the desired penetration of advanced services 
(NGA)” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 28), as it happens with the EU digital agenda12 (Vogelsang, 
2014). Besides, “any new definition of universal service has to take into consideration the 
move from telephony to broadband and from fixed to mobile networks” (Vogelsang, 
2014, p. 28). 
Vogelsang (2014) also states that the European universal service policies are usually less 
severe, when compared to US policies and, therefore, will potentially lead to less 
distortions (Vogelsang, 2014). In Germany, for example, “universal service policy only 
                                                        
12 For more information on the EU digital agenda, consult the European Commission website, at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en. 
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becomes effective if the policy goals are not achieved through competition, respectively 
by the universal service provider [and] so far regulatory intervention has never become 
necessary” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 29). Besides, apart from “some funding mechanisms in 
the U.K. (…), France and Italy, the EU has little to show under the narrow interpretation 
of universal service policies” (Vogelsang, 2014, p. 29). On the other hand, when 
considering a broad interpretation of universal service policies, the movement towards 
subsidizing the development of NGA in low density areas is expected to continue 
(Vogelsang, 2014). 
 
Access Regulation and Innovation 
The telecommunications sector is also characterized by constant innovation and 
emergence of new technologies, products, and services, which can also be a concerning 
matter to both competition and regulation, as it happens, for example, with 
telecommunication “bundles that include voice, data and subscription television services” 
(Pereira and Vareda, 2013, p. 530), which have an increasing substantial importance in 
the telecommunications industry, caused by changes in the consumer behaviour (Pereira 
and Vareda, 2013, p. 530), characterized by “a growing interest in buying these services 
jointly from one supplier, instead of buying them separately from different suppliers” 
(Pereira and Vareda, 2013, p. 530).  
Pereira and Vareda (2013) discuss two problems brought up by technological innovation 
and changes in the consumer behaviour for competition and regulation, regarding the 
appearance of bundles of services: “the impact of bundles on product market definition” 
(Pereira and Vareda, 2013, p. 530) and “the impact of bundles on the emphasis of 
regulatory policy” (Pereira and Vareda, 2013, p. 531).  
Regarding the first problem, the authors argue that “with the growing importance of 
bundles in the telecommunications industry, the traditional relevant markets for each of 
the individual services may have to give place to relevant markets for bundles” (Pereira 
and Vareda, 2013, p. 531), which creates difficulties for product market definition and 
analysis (Pereira and Vareda, 2013). Nevertheless, they also argue that “the traditional 
tools of competition policy (…) can be adjusted to deal with these new circumstances” 
(Pereira and Vareda, 2013, p. 538).  
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The second problem is related to the growing importance of “bundles that include 
subscription television services, (…) making access to content essential” (Pereira and 
Vareda, 2013, p. 538), and to the progress and innovations mentioned above, that “may 
require some changes in regulatory policy” (Pereira and Vareda, 2013, p. 531). The 
authors discuss that, considering the increasing importance of these bundles, “the ability 
to offer television content is becoming indispensable, and there is the risk that vertically 
integrated firms may foreclose the wholesale market for content” (Pereira and Vareda, 
2013, p. 531). However, technological progress allows other types of firms, such as cable 
television firms, to offer voice and data services (Pereira and Vareda, 2013), which will 
reduce the need for “access to the incumbent’s fixed telecommunications network 
services” (Pereira and Vareda, 2013, p. 531). It is also likely that, in the future, mobile 
services will become an indispensable part of telecommunications services bundles and, 
therefore, wholesale mobile services access will also be important (Pereira and Vareda, 
2013, p. 531).  
Finally, Pereira and Vareda explain that “in the recent past, regulatory policy in the 
telecommunications industry, particularly in the EU, focused on guaranteeing access to 
fixed telecommunications network services” (Pereira and Vareda, 2013, p. 531) and 
suggest that the changes described above require a change of the attention of regulatory 
policy, from ensuring fixed telecommunications network services access, to television 
content access. 
The analysis of the relationship between regulation, competition and innovation in the 
telecommunications sector is of extreme importance, since innovations in this sector 
stimulate “innovations throughout the economy” (Vogelsang, 2016, p. 2).  
Vogelsang (2016) states that there seems to be some tension between competition, 
regulation, and innovation, even though innovation, alongside with enabling competition, 
is now considered one of the major goals of regulatory policy. Regarding the relationship 
between competition and innovation, the literature supports the inverted “U” position of 
the effects of competition on innovation, which means that the existence of a certain level 
of competition is beneficial for innovation (Vogelsang, 2016), while regulation and 
innovation are considered mutual “enemies” (Vogelsang, 2016). On the one hand, 
regulation restrains or delays investments in innovative technologies, for example, by not 
allowing an appropriate rate of return for the new services (Vogelsang, 2016). On the 
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other hand, innovation “destroys (cross-subsidized) regulatory price structures or 
regulatory entry barriers” (Vogelsang, 2016, p. 2), as happened with Uber and taxi 
regulation (Vogelsang, 2016). Furthermore, despite this shift in the goals of regulatory 
policy, “the empirical evidence on innovative effects of regulation in the 
telecommunications sector is largely negative (…) [and] it appears that more regulation 
would lead to less innovation” (Vogelsang, 2016, p. 2). 
Vogelsang (2016) presents “two main reasons for potential conflicts between regulation 
and innovation” (Vogelsang, 2016, p. 2): the consumer protection issue, or the 
pricing/profit reason, and the political economy reason (Vogelsang, 2016). The first issue 
“means that innovation incentives may require larger profit opportunities than regulators 
can grant or want to grant” (Vogelsang, 2016, p. 2). The second reason “means that 
entrenched regulation of a legacy industry conflicts with helping create a new industry 
that may or may not be regulated (…) [, which] creates a bias against innovation” 
(Vogelsang, 2016, p. 2).  
The author also specifies that “a very simple model shows that a comparison of innovation 
incentives in such an unregulated industry with a regulated one leads to ambiguous results 
(…) [, but] the prospect of converting a regulated industry into an unregulated one after 
the innovation has occurred will unambiguously increase innovation incentives” 
(Vogelsang, 2016, p. 1), meaning that regulators should commit not regulate the new 
services, if their goal is to increase innovation (Vogelsang, 2016, p. 10). 
 
3.3.1 The Telefónica Case 
The Telefónica case (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica) is a very 
important reference in the study of the relationship between competition authorities and 
sectoral regulators in the telecommunications sector, particularly regarding access 
regulation, as it suggests the existence of “institutional conflicts between the Commission 
and national regulators” (Hou, 2015, p. 995). 
 
The Procedure 
This procedure began on 11 July 2003, when France Telecom España S.A. (hereafter 
referred to as “France Telecom”) submitted to the Commission a complaint against 
Telefónica S.A. (hereafter referred to as “Telefónica”),  whose main objection was that 
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“the margin between the wholesale prices Telefónica’s subsidiaries charge[d] its 
competitors for wholesale broadband access in Spain and the retail prices they charge[d] 
end-users (…) [was] not sufficient to enable Telefónica’s competitors to compete with it 
to provide end-user broadband internet access” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España 
v Telefónica, p. 7). This shows, as described in section 3.1, that in the case of competition 
policy, private parties play an important role as a trigger, since this complaint by France 
Telecom was in the origin of the Commissions’ investigation (Case COMP/38.784 – 
Wanadoo España v Telefónica).  
France Telecom España S.A. is “a fixed and mobile telecommunications operator in 
Spain (…) 100% owned by the French incumbent for telecommunications services France 
Telecom” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 6). Eresmas 
Interactiva S.A. (or “eresMas”), an ISP and portal provider in Spain, was acquired by the 
France Telecom group in 2002 and, in the last quarter of the same year, it merged with 
Wanadoo España S.L. (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). 
Telefónica, “the largest telecommunications company in Spain, (…) [with] leadership 
positions in almost all the telecommunications markets” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo 
España v Telefónica, p. 5) had, “in 2005, (…) a market share (in terms of revenue) of 
78.6% for fixed telephony and 52% for mobile telephony” (Case COMP/38.784 – 
Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 5). 
On 20 February 2006, after thoroughly investigating the complaint and obtaining 
additional information, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections (SO) to 
Telefónica, which “focussed on unfair pricing contrary to Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
[(Article 102 of TFEU)] and, (…) particular[ly], on margin squeeze practices” (Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 7). Telefónica was given the 
opportunity to comment on the preliminary findings of facts and law described in the SO, 
to which it responded on 19 May 2006 (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v 
Telefónica). Several companies and associations of companies, as Telefonica’s main 
rivals, were introduced as interested third parties throughout the procedure, including, 
among others, Tele2, ONO, Jazztel and Astel (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v 
Telefónica). On 12 and 13 June 2006, an Oral Hearing at Telefónica’s request took place, 
and “Telefónica, the complainant and interested third parties were given the opportunity 
to be heard and comment on the issues raised by the Commission in its SO” (Case 
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COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 7). After additional “requests for 
further information to Telefónica” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, 
p. 7), the Commission sent a letter to Telefónica on 11 January 2007, with the purpose of 
“inviting it to provide comments on the conclusions the Commission intended to draw 
(…) [based] on new facts not mentioned in the SO” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo 
España v Telefónica, p. 7), to which Telefónica replied, on 12 February 2007 (Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). Finally, on 4 July 2007, the 
Commission adopted a decision regarding this case (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo 
España v Telefónica). 
 
Broadband Internet Access 
Broadband Internet access “is a key element of the information society” (Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 3), and it “can be provided over 
various technological platforms: DSL (Digital Subscriber Line), cable” (Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 9), and other technologies, that “still 
represent less than 0.1% of all broadband lines in Spain” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo 
España v Telefónica, p. 11). 
ADSL, or Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line, is a DSL-based technology (Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica) “which provides high-speed internet 
access using a telephone line” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 
3) and currently the prevailing broadband internet provision technology for residential 
customers in several Member States, including Spain (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo 
España v Telefónica), “followed by cable-modem (21% of broadband connections)” 
(Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 9). On the one hand, Telefónica, 
the incumbent, is the only telecommunications operator with a nation-wide fixed 
telephone network in Spain (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). On 
the other hand, while the network inherited from the former monopoly allows ADSL 
technology to be homogeneously available in all the Spanish territory, cable-modem 
technology is heterogeneously available throughout Spain, and only 40% of its population 
can get broadband access using this technology, due to the obstacles that cable operators 
had to overcome to build their networks (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v 
Telefónica). 
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It is also important to notice that “the Spanish retail broadband internet access market is 
characterised by the large number of promotions (mainly regarding the connection fee, 
the equipment, free or reduced-monthly subscriptions, and sometimes promotional gifts 
that apparently bear no direct relationship with the contracted broadband product) 
proposed by Telefónica and its competitors to attract new subscribers (…) [, which] have 
in fact been a key competition tool between operators in the retail market” (Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 18). Besides, the emergence of 
bundles that include voice and Internet (“double play” offers), and television (“triple 
play” offers) (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica) has been an 
important development in the telecommunications industry (Pereira and Vareda, 2013) 
for Telefónica and its competitors (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). 
Although these “offers have (…) been at the core of the cable operators' attempts to enter 
and expand in the broadband internet access market” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo 
España v Telefónica, p. 18), these operators still lost market share during the period under 
investigation (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). 
This means that, if Telefonica’s competitors wish to provide broadband internet access to 
consumers, they have two options: build their own local access network, which would 
require large investments and time and is, therefore, not economically viable (Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica); or, “they can contract wholesale 
broadband access” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 3). 
Regarding wholesale broadband access, there are three types of services available to 
Telefónica’s competitors: two of them (the provision of wholesale access at local level 
and at regional level) are exclusively provided by Telefónica, while the other (several 
national wholesale offers) can be provided by either Telefónica or its competing operators 
(Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). Nevertheless, these competing 
operators still depend upon Telefónica’s inputs to be able to supply this service, since 
TESAU (Telefónica de España, S.A.U, a subsidiary of Telefónica S.A.) “is the only 
operator having a local access network (i.e. access to most Spanish households and 
businesses) in the entire Spanish territory” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v 
Telefónica, p. 19). Therefore, no matter the alternative chosen, Telefonica’s competitors 
will always be dependent on TESAU’s local access network when they contract a 
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wholesale ADSL service available on the market (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo 
España v Telefónica).  
On the other hand, cable operators do not rely on Telefonica’s network to provide retail 
broadband services but, at the same time, they have not exercised enough pressure on 
Telefónica’s prices at the retail level (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v 
Telefónica). 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that Telefónica “has been in a position to control and 
influence market prices, output, innovation, variety and the quality of services on the 
market for a significant period” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 
3). 
 
Relevant Markets and Dominance 
In its analysis, the Commission identified three relevant markets, one at the retail level 
and two at the wholesale broadband access level. The relevant retail market includes all 
standard broadband products, regardless of the technology used to provide it (ADSL, 
etc.), “marketed in the “mass market” for both residential and non-residential users” (Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 3). The relevant wholesale broadband 
access markets consist on the regional wholesale broadband market and the national 
wholesale broadband market and they both exclude all wholesale access services 
provided through any technology, other than ADSL (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo 
España v Telefónica). Moreover, the relevant geographic market in all cases is the 
Spanish market, “as also stated by the CMT on various occasions” (Case COMP/38.784 
– Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 60). The Commission also states that “dominant 
position” can be defined, as specified by the Court of Justice, as “a position of economic 
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition 
being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its 
consumers” (Case C–27/76 - United Brands and Others v Commission, 1978) (apud Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 62). 
Therefore, the Commission concluded that, during period of the infringement, Telefónica 
had a dominant position in the three relevant markets described above (Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). 
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The Abuse 
However, holding a dominant position is not contrary to the competition rules in itself 
(Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica), but only the abuse of such 
position or, in other words, when “the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position 
(…) is such as to influence the structure of a market (…) [and] has the effect of hindering 
the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of 
that competition” (Case 85/76 – Hoffmann-La Roche, 1979) (apud Case COMP/38.784 
– Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 78). Therefore, since a margin squeeze occurs when 
the difference between the upstream and the downstream prices is too narrow, there is no 
need to demonstrate that either the wholesale price or the retail price are excessive in 
themselves (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). In this sense, “the 
Commission (…)  [determined] that the relevant downstream market is the mass market 
for retail broadband access and the upstream markets are those of (i) wholesale broadband 
access at regional level and (ii) wholesale broadband access at national level” (Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 197). The Commission, then, 
evaluated whether the margin between these prices was “sufficient to cover its 
downstream incremental costs” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 
198) and established that Telefonica’s upstream prices at both levels “do not allow an as 
efficient competitor to replicate (…) [its] prices for retail broadband access since 
September 2001” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 198). 
Moreover, the Commission determined that Telefonica’s practice was capable and likely 
to restrict competition in the retail market and also found empirical evidence consistent 
with the existence of an actual restrictive effect from these practices, which resulted in 
consumer harm (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). When analysing 
if Telefonica’s conduct could be objectively justified or it produced efficiencies (positive 
effects) that outweighed its negative effects on competition (Case COMP/38.784 – 
Wanadoo España v Telefónica), the Commission concluded that “there is no objective 
justification or efficiency defences to Telefónica's behaviour” (Case COMP/38.784 – 
Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 4). 
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Regulation of the Services Concerned by the Decision 
The Commission explains that, under national telecommunications regulation, which is 
“based on and compatible with Community law” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo 
España v Telefónica, p. 82), Telefónica is obliged to supply wholesale access at both 
levels under fair conditions, since its refusal or its supply under unreasonable terms would 
harm “the emergence and/or continuation of sustainable competition at the retail level” 
(Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 81). This means that “when 
Telefónica decided to enter the retail broadband market on a mass basis and upgrade its 
infrastructure, it knew that the obligation to provide regional wholesale access would be 
maintained” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 86). 
The Commission also assessed the type of regulation observed in the three relevant 
markets mentioned above. First, while TESAU’s retail broadband access services prices 
were subject to regulation from 3 August 2001 to 1 November 2003, the retail prices of 
the other subsidiaries of Telefónica S.A. were not regulated (Case COMP/38.784 – 
Wanadoo España v Telefónica). On the one hand, under the Spanish General 
Telecommunications Law 11/1998, the CDGAE (Comisión Delegada del Gobierno para 
Asuntos Económicos) “had the power to set, on a provisional basis, fixed, minimum and 
maximum prices, the criteria for their establishment and the mechanisms for their control, 
(…) [considering] the actual costs of service provision and the level of competition 
between operators in the market” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, 
p. 29). On the other hand, “TESAU was obliged to present to the Ministry of Economy 
and to the Ministry of Science and Technology its proposals for new prices for approval 
by the CDGAE” (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 29). In this 
context, TESAU proposed its retail prices, which were approved as fixed prices by the 
CDGAE , on 3 August 2001 (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). 
Nevertheless, given the type of regulation applicable to the retail price, TESAU was 
always free to propose a new (higher) price for approval by the CDGAE (Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica), but chose not to do it. Finally, the retail 
prices were liberalized on 1 November 2003, although TESAU was still obligated to 
communicate any changes in its retail ADSL services prices before their introduction in 
the market (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica), or “any changes to the 
structure of its retail prices, and to propose new corresponding wholesale tariffs” (Case 
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COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 30), according to the relevant 
wholesale regulation. Second, “the regulation applicable to TESAU's regional wholesale 
service has only imposed a maximum price level and has been such that TESAU could 
have decreased at any time the charges for this service on its own initiative” (Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 36). Third, wholesale services prices 
were not regulated, which means that Telefonica could have reduced its charges at any 
time (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). The Commission also adds 
that a retail-minus price regime was implemented regarding the regional wholesale offer 
by the CMT, before December 2006 (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v 
Telefónica). Under this price regime, “the regulator defines the minimum value of the 
difference between the retail price and the access price” (Sarmento and Brandão, 2007, 
p. 237), which corresponds, in this case, to the wholesale access charge. 
 
Conclusion 
The Commission found that, from September 2001 to December 2006, Telefónica 
imposed a margin squeeze between its retail prices and its wholesale access prices, both 
at regional and national level, which constitutes an abuse of its dominant position (Case 
COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). This does not mean, however, that 
Telefónica did not engage “in other abusive behaviour in the Spanish broadband markets” 
(Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 4). Besides, the existing 
regulation did not forbid Telefónica to restructure its prices and, therefore, ending the 
margin squeeze (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). 
In conclusion, “Telefónica (i.e. the economic entity formed by Telefónica S.A. and (…) 
[its subsidiaries]) has infringed Article 82 of the EC Treaty [(Article 102 of the TFEU)] 
by imposing unfair prices on its competitors in the form of a margin squeeze (…), 
throughout the period from September 2001 to December 2006” (Case COMP/38.784 – 
Wanadoo España v Telefónica, p. 199) and Telefónica S.A. and Telefónica de España 
S.A.U were condemned to pay, jointly and severally liable, a fine of 151 875 000 euros 
(Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica). 
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Aftermath 
After the Commission’s decision, Telefónica appealed to the General Court, requesting 
the annulment of the decision or a reduction of the fine (Case T–336/07), alleging a 
“breach of the rights of the defence” (Judgement of the General Court of 29 March 2012, 
Case T-336/07, EU:T:2012:172, paragraph 65) and several errors of fact and law in the 
Commission’s conduct (Case T–336/07), but the General Court dismissed the action and 
confirmed the Commission’s decision. Additionally, the Spanish State also requested the 
annulment of the decision (Case T–398/07), claiming, among other pleas in law, “an 
infringement of the duty of sincere cooperation laid down (…) [in the] Framework 
Directive” (Judgement of the General Court 29 March 2012, Case T‑398/07, 
EU:T:2012:173, paragraph 38). The General Court stated that the CMT was “involved in 
the administrative proceedings in this case” (Case T–398/07, point 8), since the 
Commission not only sent three request for information to the regulator, but also kept it 
informed throughout the process (Case T–398/07). Besides, the fact that the services 
subject to the Commission’s decision were regulated “in accordance with the applicable 
European directives” (Judgement of the General Court 29 March 2012, Case T‑398/07, 
EU:T:2012:173, paragraph 50) is not relevant, since regulated sectors are still subject to 
competition law (Case T–398/07). For that reason, the General Court also dismissed this 
action. 
Afterwards, Telefónica appealed the judgment to the Court of Justice (Case C–295/12 P) 
seeking an annulment of the decision or a reduction of the fine, which was dismissed. 
 
Further Comments 
Jones and Sufrin (2016) state that “the decision [in the Telefónica case] is notable for the 
Commission’s careful analysis of Telefónica’s costs and of the possible prejudicial effects 
on consumers (…), using LRAIC as the appropriate standard (Jones and Sufrin, 2016, p. 
423). 
Hou (2015) studies “the institutional conflicts between SSR [(Sector Specific 
Regulators)] and EU competition law” (Hou, 2015, p. 981) and considers “three cases 
[that] suggest three types of institutional conflicts between the Commission and national 
regulators” (Hou, 2015, p. 995): The Deutsche Telekom case (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 
37.578, 37.579 – Deutsche Telekom AG), the Telefónica case, and the Telekomunikacja 
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Polska case (Case COMP/39.525 – Telekomunikacja Polska).  Regarding the Telefónica 
case, the author states that even though the Commission recognized the advantage of the 
retail-minus price regime “in eradicating price squeeze concerns” (Hou, 2015, p. 992), 
two divergences between the Commission’s vision and the Spanish regulator’s vision can 
be pointed out (Hou, 2015). On the one hand, when the Commission assesses the 
existence of a price squeeze through an equally efficient competitor approach, it only 
considers “whether the wholesale price is (…) [higher] than the retail price minus retail 
operational costs” (Hou, 2015, pp. 992–993), while the regulator’s retail-minus approach 
also includes “a reasonable profit margin in Telefonica’s wholesale offer [, making] the 
regulated wholesale price higher than what was legitimate under EU competition law” 
(Hou, 2015, pp. 992–993). On the other hand, by taking advantage of the ex post nature 
of competition enforcement, the Commission’s approach included historical data on the 
retail operational costs collected during the investigated period, while the Spanish 
regulated had to implement “a forward-looking analysis on the operational costs in 2001” 
(Hou, 2015, p. 993), and could only rely upon “inaccurate data (…) for a long time, i.e. 
about five years” (Hou, 2015, p. 1001). Therefore, even though there are advantages to 
the retail-minus approach, the use of inaccurate data by the Spanish regulator “led to 
inefficient regulation” (Hou, 2015, p. 995). Besides, the fact that the national regulator 
did not realize or correct its mistake during such a long period, hints that it might be 
captured (Hou, 2015). Moreover, “since the distortion of competition is not merely 
abstract, the Commission’s intervention gives added value in this case” (Hou, 2015, p. 
1001) and “it seems that the Commission can retroactively keep national regulators under 
check” (Hou, 2015, p. 996). 
Another interesting aspect of this case that is usually less noticed is that the “EU 
competition law was in conflict with two generations of telecom regulatory frameworks” 
(Hou, 2015, pp. 998–999). This happens because the current regulatory framework only 
became effective after “the first market review carried out by national regulators” in 2007, 
instead of 2003, as it originally intended (Hou, 2015). Therefore, even though this 
decision came out after 2003, the regulatory framework that was in effect was the 
previous one (from 1998), which “did not establish a good coordination mechanism” 
(Hou, 2015, p. 999), thus justifying the Commission’s intervention. 
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Conclusion  
The comparison of the characteristics of the type of interventions carried out by 
competition authorities and sectoral regulators demonstrates that there are many 
advantages to both authorities, depending on situation. Since overlap and common goals 
between the two authorities can exist at the same time, it is of extreme importance to 
study how the interface between competition law and sectoral regulation should be 
managed (Dabbah, 2011). 
Although concurrency is considered the best model by authors like Dabbah (2011), it is 
not possible to find a single solution that can be applied to all sectors and countries 
(Marques et al., 2005), since the choice of the model applicable to a certain sector in a 
certain country should be sensible to several aspects (Dabbah, 2011), such as, for 
example, the relative advantages of each authority (Marques et al., 2005; Carlton and 
Picker, 2014), or the characteristics of the country and the sector in question (Marques et 
al., 2005). Besides, these options are unlikely to be static (Marques et al., 2005), since 
they depend, among other factors, on the level of effective competition in the sector 
concerned (Marques et al., 2005). Even so, the interface established for managing the 
relationship between competition authorities and sectoral regulators in the 
telecommunications sector could, in the European Commission’s vision, “hopefully 
become a model for other sectors” (DGCEC, 2005, p. 36). 
Despite the tendency observed of partial or full deregulation, it is still important that 
regulation exists when the characteristics of the sector require so (Carlton and Picker, 
2014). On the other hand, it is very important to study the relationship between 
competition, regulation and innovation since innovations in this sector stimulate 
“innovations throughout the economy” (Vogelsang, 2016, p. 2) and, although the 
literature is in accordance with the vision that the existence of a certain level of 
competition is beneficial for innovation (Vogelsang, 2016), regulation can have negative 
effects on innovation and innovation can have negative effects on regulation (Vogelsang, 
2016).  
The study of access regulation is of extreme importance because, even though access 
regulation is essential for promoting competition (Lestage and Flacher, 2014), it can, 
under certain circumstances, have a negative impact on the levels of investment (Lestage 
and Flacher, 2014; Manenti and Scialà, 2013; Kim et al., 2011; Grajek and Röller, 2012). 
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The Telefónica case (Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v Telefónica) suggests the 
existence of “institutional conflicts between the Commission and national regulators” 
(Hou, 2015, p. 995), particularly “a conflict of EU competition law with the 1998 
regulatory framework” (Hou, 2015, p. 1004). However, the Commission’s actions may 
be justified, since even though this decision came out after 2003, the regulatory 
framework that was in effect was the previous one (from 1998), which “did not establish 
a good coordination mechanism” (Hou, 2015, p. 999) between the two authorities. 
A similar study and comparison with other EU cases, such as the Deutsche Telekom and 
the Telekomunikacja Polska cases, as suggested by Hou (2015), would be important to 
strengthen this work, and a review on US cases to deepen the investigation on whether 
the policies followed in the US and the EU are likely to converge in the future, as studied 
by Vogelsang (2014). On the same line of thought, the consideration of more recent cases 
could help understand if there are any similar conflicts between the current EU regulatory 
framework and competition law. 
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